January 6, 1899.] 



SCIENCE. 



19 



win, if I riglitljr understand him, derives 

 all ethical phenomena from social relations. 

 This I believe to be an error. Economic 

 motives are specific cravings of particular 

 organs or groups of organs. Complete 

 satisfaction of economic wants may deprive 

 other organs of their due satisfaction. The 

 protest of the neglected organs and the 

 hunger of the entire organism for integral 

 satisfaction is, I believe, the original source 

 of all ethical motive, which, therefore, is in- 

 definitely developed by, but not initiated 

 in, the ' dialectic of personal growth.' * 



It seems probable, then, that in ' the dia- 

 lectic of personal growth,' the original ego 

 with which the dialectic starts, plays 

 throughout a controlling part ; and that, 

 after all, the process of developing a socius 

 is one which consists essentially in modify- 

 ing, by means of social relations and activi- 

 ties, an originally independent self. 



The modification, however, is undoubt- 

 edly produced by the process of give and 

 take between ego and alter. The question, 

 then, that I wish next to raise is: Is the give 

 and take, in which the ego engages, carried 

 on indiscriminately with any alter, or is 

 there, from the very beginning of conscious 

 life, a tendency to discriminate between one 

 and another alter, and to limit the condi- 

 tions of personal growth by that state of 

 consciousness which may be described as a 

 consciousness of similars or of kind ? Scat- 

 tered throughout Professor Baldwin's writ- 

 ings are many intimations that he has 

 suspected, or perhaps even been definitely 

 aware of, such limitations. I do not find, 

 however, that he has anywhere endeavored 

 to formulate them or to bring them system- 

 atically within the formulas of his dialectic. 



What, then, are some of the inquiries 

 which should be made in regard to these 

 limitations ? 



* I have considered this subject at greater length in 

 an article on ' The Ethical Motive,' in the International 

 Journal of Ethics, April, 1898. 



First, I think that we should inquire 

 whether, long before any discriminations of 

 kind have become possible, a preparation 

 for them and a tendency toward them is 

 made in conscious experience. Of the sen- 

 sations which first arise in consciousness 

 some are received from the bodily organism 

 which the self inhabits ; some are received 

 from similar bodily organisms, and some 

 are received from wholly unlike objects in 

 the external world. ISTow, we know that 

 many sensations received from self are so 

 nearly like sensations received from like- 

 selves that, merely as sensations, they can 

 be distinguished only with difficulty. If, 

 for example, I strike with my voice a cer- 

 tain note of the musical scale, and another 

 person a moment after strikes the same note 

 with his voice, my auditory sensations in 

 the two cases will be very neai-ly alike. If 

 I cry out in pain, and then hear another 

 man like myself cry out in pain, my audi- 

 tory sensations will be nearly alike. If, 

 however, I hear a dog bark the sensation 

 will be different from that which I have re- 

 ceived from my own voice. If I walk with 

 my friend down the street, and happen to 

 notice the motion of my feet as I take suc- 

 cessive steps, and then to notice the motion 

 of my friend's feet, the visual sensations 

 will, in these two cases, be closely alike. 

 If, however, I happen to notice the trotting 

 of a horse that is being driven by me the 

 visual sensation will be different from that 

 which I have received in observing my own 

 steps. If I stroke the back of my hand, and 

 then stroke the back of my friend's hand, I 

 shall receive tactual sensations that are 

 closely alike. If, then, I stroke the fur of a 

 cat or the mane of a horse, or touch the paw 

 of a cat or the hoof of a horse, I shall re- 

 ceive sensations ver}' different from those 

 received from the back of my hand. It ap- 

 pears, then, that before there is any power 

 to make discriminations of anj' kind, even 

 to think of differences of sensation, sensa- 



