126 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. IX. No. 213. 



asmuch as every particle knows them, and 

 it is only as known that they exist. 



According to our author's own principles 

 and assumptions, space or time, or number 

 or motion, which are not the consciousness 

 of particles are but the ghosts of judgment, 

 the creation of entities out of nothing, for 

 if he is right the esse of these properties 

 must be percipi. 



It must not be inferred that I am myself 

 an idealist, for nothing could be farther 

 from the truth. I seek to be neither an 

 idealist nor a materialist, nor a realist nor 

 a nionist, but a naturalist, believing that it 

 will be time to have an opinion as to the 

 relation between mind and matter after we 

 have found out. 



For all I know to the contrary, Powell 

 may be right, and every particle of matter 

 may have judgment as consciousness and 

 choice ; but the test of truth is evidence, 

 and not the absence of disproof, and belief 

 in the judgment of particles does not con- 

 cern me. 



Our author's belief that all mind is mat- 

 ter in motion, and all matter in motion 

 mind, or, at least, the raw material of mind, 

 is not new. In fact, it seems to be the most 

 characteristic ' philosophy ' of our day. 



" All systems of philosophy are vanity," 

 say the students of science ; but to Sam 

 "Weller's question : " What is your particu- 

 lar vanity ?" they all, with one accord, be- 

 gin to cry ' Monism !' 



If I seem to some to have devoted more 

 space to this new book on ' philosophy ' 

 than it deserves ; if I sit patiently among 

 the audience, listening attentively as the 

 philosophers play out their little plays ; it is 

 because of my hope that they may destroy 

 each other like Kilkenny cats before the 

 curtain drops, and that, in the last act, 

 they who are no philosophers, but simple 

 honest folks, may come by their own and 

 live at ease. 



Because of this hope I study the philoso- 



phers as well as I can that I may be the 

 better able to do my part in bringing the 

 desired end about. 



W. K. Beooks. 



Johns Hopkins University. 



TRUTH AND ERROR* 



Whatevkr else may be thought or said, 

 all will probably agree that this is a unique 

 and remarkable book. It is intensely orig- 

 inal. The author is omniscient and dis- 

 cusses the universe. He treats, like Scal- 

 iger of old, de omni re scibili et quibusdam 

 aliis. As a specimen of what Kant called 

 ' architectonic symmetry ' it probably has 

 never been excelled. It is essentially a 

 philosophic or scientific terminology, but 

 all the terms are new, for even where old 

 terms are used they are invariably given 

 new meanings. The whole book is, there- 

 fore, like a foi'eign language, and the read- 

 er's first task is to learn the language. 

 Everything that has been said or done by 

 man is rejected as unsatisfactory and the 

 temple of philosophy is entirely rebuilt 

 out of new bricks cast in new molds. The 

 friction thus caused in reading the book 

 will, therefore, probably deter many from 

 making so great an effort, and one of the 

 objects of a sympathetic treatment should 

 be to point out that the effort will be re- 

 paid. 



Notwithstanding, however, this ' archi- 

 tectonic symmetry,' the reader has a right 

 justly to complain that his path has not 

 been made as easy as it might have been. 

 The terms are generally defined, it is true, 

 but the definitions are scattered through 

 the text and have to be hunted up many 

 times, as they cannot be remembered on 

 once reading. They should have been all 

 collected together in one place and arranged 

 in alphabetical order as a complete glossary. 



* Truth and Error, or the Science of Intellection. 

 By J. W. Powell. Chicago, The Open Court Pub- 

 lishing Company. 



