MAECH24, 1899.] 



SCIENCE. 



443 



over also into qualitativelj^ diffei-ent states of 

 excitement, and thus allow an unlimited 

 manifoldness of new psychophysical varia- 

 tions. But it is clear that to accept such 

 an hypothesis means to give up all the ad- 

 vantages of brain localization. The com- 

 plicatedness of the cell would be in itself 

 sufficient to give ground to the idea that its 

 molecules may reach some millions of dif- 

 ferent local combinations, and if every new 

 combination corresponds to a sensation all 

 the tones and colors and smells and many 

 other things may go on in one cell. But, 

 then, it is, of course, our duty to explain those 

 connections and successions of different 

 states in one cell, and that would lead to 

 thinking the cell itself as constructed with 

 millions of paths just like a miniature brain; 

 in short, all the difficulties would be trans- 

 planted into the unknown structure of the 

 cell. If we, on the other hand, do not 

 enter into such speculations the acceptance 

 of qualitive changes in the cell would bring 

 us to the same point as if we were satisfied 

 to speak of qualitative changes of the brain 

 in general. It would not solve the problem, 

 bvit merely ignore it, and, therefore, such an 

 additional hj'pothesis cannot have weight. 

 The only theory which brings in a really 

 new factor is the theory of innervation 

 feelings. This well-known theory claims 

 that one special group of conscious facts, 

 namely, the feelings of effort and impulse, 

 are not sensations and, therefore, not par- 

 allel to the sensory excitements, but are 

 activities of consciousness and parallel to 

 the phj'siological innervation of a central 

 motor path. At this point, of course, comes 

 in at once the opposition of the philo- 

 sophical claim that every psychical fact 

 must be a content of consciousness, and 

 made up of sensations, that is, of possible 

 elements of idea, to become describable and 

 explainable at all. The so-called active 

 consciousness, the philosopher must hold, 

 has nothing to do with an activity of the 



consciousness itself, as consciousness means, 

 from the psj'chological standpoint, only the 

 kind of existence of psychical objects. It 

 cannot do anything, it cannot have differ- 

 ent degrees and functions, it only becomes 

 conscious of its contents, and all variations 

 are variations of the content, which must 

 be analyzed without remainder into ele- 

 ments which are theoretically coordinated 

 with the elements of ideas, that is, with the 

 sensations, while consciousness is only the 

 general condition for their existence. But 

 also the empirical analysis and experiment 

 of the practical psj^chologist are in this case 

 in the greatest harmony with such philo- 

 sopjiical claims and opposed to the innerva- 

 tion theory. The psychologist can show 

 empirically that this so-called feeling of 

 effort is merely a group of sensations like 

 other sensations, reproduced joint and 

 muscle sensations which precede the action 

 and have the role of representing the im- 

 pulse merel}^ on account of the fact that 

 their anticipation makes inhibitory associa- 

 tions still possible. It would thus fi'om 

 this point of view also be illogical to think 

 the psychophj^sical basis of these sensations 

 different in principle from that of other sen- 

 sations. If the other sensations are accom- 

 paniments of sensory excitements in the 

 brain the feelings of impulse cannot claim 

 an exceptional position. 



But are quality and intensity really the 

 only differences between the given sensa- 

 tions ? Can the whole manifoldness of the 

 content of consciousness really be deter- 

 mined by variations in these two directions 

 only ? Certainly not ; the sensations can 

 vary even when quality and intensity re- 

 main constant. As an illustration we may 

 think, for instance, of one variation which 

 is cleai'ly not to be compared with a change 

 in kind and strength of the sensation ; 

 namely, the variation of vividness. Vivid- 

 ness is not identical mth intensity ; the 

 vivid impression of a weak sound and the 



