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iClENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. IX. No. 231. 



true relation of induction to deduction is both 

 made clear in an introductory chapter and 

 souudly adhered to afterwards. These are 

 throughout described, not as two distinct things, 

 but as distinguished phases of one and the same 

 total activity of thought ; deduction throwing 

 an explicit emphasis upon the particularizing 

 and synthetic aspect, while induction emphasizes 

 the analytic and generalizing sides. The nature 

 and distinction, likewise, of observation and ex- 

 planation are very adequately set forth in the 

 introductory chapter. Observation, the author 

 earnestly enforces, is not a mere staring at facts : 

 " To observe well it is necessary to be more or 

 less definitely conscious of what one is looking 

 for ; etc., etc." Though he reserves the express 

 assertion of the influence of hypothesis on even 

 preliminary observation to a later chapter, it is 

 implied throughout. Naturally, therefore, the 

 difference, too, between observation and expla- 

 nation is regarded not as absolute, but as largely 

 a mere convenient one — of the final articulate 

 bringing to bear of reason on experience, in 

 contradistinction from an earlier half-groping 

 stage of the same thing. So, likewise, of course, 

 the goal of induction is conceived to lie, not in 

 a mere empirical, passive gleaning of causal 

 connections and generalities, but in the com- 

 pletion of that explanation we have just been 

 speaking of — the active expansion of the living 

 system of self-conscious human reason for and 

 by the inclusion of the facts under investigation. 

 After the introductory chapter come three 

 others on Methods of Observation— the first 

 dealing with Enumeration and Statistics, the 

 two others with the Determination of Causal 

 Relations — under which head is given an expo- 

 sition of the Methods of Mill. All this is well 

 done, though, as already suggested, the simple 

 acceptance of Mill's 'methods' as undisputed 

 descriptions of the actual procedure of science 

 is open to grave dissent. However, there is no 

 failure to point out the drawbacks of the several 

 methods separately ; nor is the author in any 

 sense guilty of treating them as being more than 

 what at best they are — mere methods of observ- 

 ing, that is to say, methods not for the final 

 solution of scientific problems, but, as Welton 

 has aptly put it, methods merely for suggest- 

 ing hypotheses. The two chapters on Methods 



of Explanation — the first on Analogy and the 

 second on The Use of Hypotheses — as well 

 as the concluding chapter on Fallacies of In- 

 ductive Reasoning, call for no comment. All 

 are very good pieces of work. 



Part HI. deals with The Nature of Thought. 

 Starting from the view of thought as an organ- 

 ism, and of knowledge as a passage not from 

 the inward and known to the outside and un- 

 known, but always from a previous partial 

 knowledge to one of greater perfection, the au- 

 thor goes on to point out that thought and 

 knowledge unfold or develop in accordance with 

 the general laws of evolution ; that this devel- 

 opment is a progressive process both of differ- 

 entiation and integration ; that the different in- 

 tellectual operations, as conception, judgment 

 and inference, or induction and deduction, are 

 not separate processes, but stages in one and 

 the same activity ; and that the nature of this 

 activity is essentially discoverable in its sim- 

 plest and most elementary form, the judgment ; 

 — for the concept is not the oi'iginal element, out 

 of which judgment is afterwards compounded, 

 but is only the series of judgments that have 

 already been made and that serve as the start- 

 ing-point for new judgments. Judgment, ac- 

 cordingly, is the main theme of this present 

 subdivision of our study. 



The chief characteristics of judgment as the 

 type of all thovight and knowledge are : (1) its 

 universality (claim of truth for everybody) ; (2) 

 its necessity (not a mere psychological compul- 

 sion, but one arising from the dependence of 

 judgment on grounds) ; (3) that it is always both 

 synthetic and analytic ; (4) that it is construct- 

 ive of a S!/s?e)n of knowledge. In this connection, 

 however, require to be considered also the so- 

 called ' Three Laws of Thought. ' As very com- 

 monly put, these pretended supreme 'axioms' 

 of judgment are altogether false. Rightly for- 

 mulated, though, they are real laws of thought, 

 in the sense of being implied in and descriptive 

 of the thought-process as just set forth. (The 

 topic of laws of thought in general, or of Cate- 

 gories, Professor Creighton does not enter upon.) 

 The development of judgment, from a merely 

 felt to a conscious necessity, gives rise to types 

 of judgment. The succession of these is traced 

 on broadly Hegelian lines, from quality 



