April 30, 1920] 



SCIENCE 



423 



often very incidentally and with some specific 

 and immediate need in mind. 



Thus, in certain bureaus of the service em- 

 ployees are required to dedicate their in- 

 ventions or patents to the government out- 

 right, even in the absence of legal authority 

 for the procedure; in others they are pro- 

 hibited from taking out patents at all; in 

 others, if they take them out, they must 

 dedicate them to the public; in others, again, 

 the employee may retain title to the patent 

 and make what profit he can with it in the 

 open market, but the government reserves the 

 right of free license thereunder. In some 

 cases this free license is restricted only to 

 the bureau in which the invention originated, 

 the patentee being at liberty to profit individ- 

 ually from the use of his invention by other 

 branches of the service. 



Then, again, in the same division, or 

 bureau, the requirements on the individual 

 will vary according to the nature of the serv- 

 ice for which he was specifically employed 

 and the character of the invention, i. e., 

 whether the invention was evolved in the 

 course or as a result of his regular duties, or 

 not. These illustrations represent merely a 

 few of the many questions arising with regard 

 to the existing relation between the govern- 

 ment and its employees in the matter of in- 

 ventions and patents. 



If the employee dedicates his invention to 

 the government it can not fully benefit the 

 public, because, as has been stated, there is 

 no existing instriunentality for translating 

 inventions protected under government-owned 

 patents into practical, industrial service, and 

 they become practically a waste product. 



If a patent be dedicated to the public un- 

 conditionally, the public is generally the 

 loser, as has been indicated above, because 

 protection to the capital required to exploit 

 the patent is lacking, and because a patent so 

 dedicated, though possibly pioneer and funda- 

 mental may be in such a form that a sub- 

 sequent patent taken out by another, less 

 generous inventor on an improvement prac- 

 tically essential to its effective application 

 may operate to exclude its free public use. 



Also, in this contingency, its successful use 

 by the government, itself, is prevented, unless 

 the government assents to whatever condi- 

 tions the owner of the improvement may 

 impose. If for any reason this should be 

 deemed inadvisable, the government can, of 

 course, use the improved invention without 

 express license, just as it can use any other 

 patented invention, as provided by Special 

 Act of Congress, June 25, 1910, Stat. 851. 

 But the situation thereby created is unsatis- 

 factory, because such action entails litigation 

 before the Court of Claims to determine a 

 reasonable compensation to the patentee, in 

 addition to which the approval of Congress 

 by special enactment must be had before the 

 compensation can be awarded. This is a 

 formidable, costly and tedious business, both 

 for the government and the plaintiff, and 

 besides, works particular hardship and loss to 

 the latter. Indeed, unless the compensation 

 involved should be large it would probably be 

 consumed in the process of securing it. 



The tendency of the generally unsatis- 

 factory situation here outlined has been to 

 discourage inventiveness among government 

 workers, and the considerations enumerated 

 call loudly for some settled, definite and 

 equitable disposition of this involved matter, 

 particularly in view of the enormously in- 

 creased activities and needs of the govern- 

 ment and the business world brought about by 

 the demands of the present war, and the un- 

 precedented need for inventions which has 

 ensued. It must be realized that the develop- 

 ment and administration of inventions and 

 patents involve business problems which 

 should be handled in an intelligent business- 

 like way. The present haphazard, futile 

 manner of treating them makes for lost 

 motion and waste of effort. 



The Bill here under consideration grants 

 the authority to try out essentially an experi- 

 ment in constructive economics which, if 

 successful, can not fail to lead to results of 

 fundamental importance, and which, if un- 

 reasonable compensation to the patentee, in 

 successful, will, by reason of the measure's 

 purely permissive character, be self-elimina- 



