104 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXVII. No. 942 



respect either to its scope or its degree-con- 

 ferring power — its constitution, in a word, as 

 an institution of the " university type " — and, 

 while it may be necessary to begin as he sug- 

 gests, the writer deems it important to keep 

 the ideal before the country, and so lets the 

 paper stand as written.) 



Kepler Hoyt 

 4114 Fessenden Place, 

 Washington, D. C. 



neo-vitalism and the logic of science 

 To THE Editor of Science: In the discus- 

 sion to which you have recently given space 

 concerning the availability for science of the 

 system of implications to which vitalism and 

 the conception of entelechies lead, it is impor- 

 tant to refresh one's memory concerning the 

 general methodological postulates of science, 

 for in the final analysis every special argu- 

 ment in such a case is nothing but the asser- 

 tion of a specific point of view in regard to 

 the system of conceptions with which science 

 works in reducing the world of phenomena to 

 order. 



The conception of intelligible order is the 

 product of a slow intellectual development 

 which is reenacted by every human society in 

 its progress toward civilization and by every 

 child in its growth toward mental adulthood. 

 Between the theoretical limits of a world of 

 anomy and the assumption of necessary law 

 the evolution of this concept presents an infi- 

 nite series of modifications. The universal 

 presence of law is the underlying assumption 

 on which all investigation proceeds, and the 

 advancement of science is measured by the 

 field which it has redeemed from chaos and 

 conceived in terms of intelligible order. But 

 in certain of its relations this conception is 

 scarcely more than a theoretical postulate 

 which expresses a logical conviction as to the 

 nature of the world and inspires the persistent 

 search after new laws. It expresses the belief, 

 in regard to each unreduced phenomenon, that 

 the logical canons which have guided investi- 

 gation to a triumphant conclusion in other 

 fields must ultimately be found valid here also. 

 As to the phenomenal basis of such concep- 



tions common observation sufficiently estab- 

 lishes the fact of recurrence, both of elements 

 and complexes. Familiarity with these connec- 

 tions of experiences, however, does not carry 

 the mind inevitably toward their uniformity. 

 Man's first uncritical reflection leads only to 

 the general expectation of recurrence. Fail- 

 ures and fulfilment must equally be accepted 

 as facts. In one field order prevails, in an- 

 other, caprice. It is an empirical inference 

 which no more assumes necessary connection 

 as its reflective postulate in the one case than 

 it does anomy in the other. But the human 

 mind is not content to rest at this stage. The 

 world of phenomena is not a pure object of 

 contemplation. It is endowed with energy 

 and penetrated with living potencies and pur- 

 poses, conceived in terms of agents and active 

 causes. These spiritual powers in whom 

 change is grounded are unique as well as 

 individual, and each is marked by a charac- 

 teristic activity. The world must be taken as 

 it is found; if unpredictable as well as de- 

 pendable successions occur, the causes to 

 which they are referred must correspondingly 

 vary. Arbitrary and capricious wills appear 

 on the theater of events along with those 

 which are consistent and inalterable. Wonder 

 and miracle lie embedded in the world's struc- 

 ture alongside of established and predictable 

 order. 



The habit of thus conceiving phenomena in 

 terms of disparate principles dies hard. It 

 yields only before the slow extension of law 

 as the investigations of science are pushed 

 farther and farther and one range of phe- 

 nomena after another is brought under con- 

 trol. At first it is not perceived by the scien- 

 tist himself that the postulate of universal 

 and necessary law underlies all his procedure, 

 that the conception of uniformity is not con- 

 firmed by the slow accumulation of evidence 

 but constitutes the basis of every conclusion 

 he draws. The principle of all scientific 

 method is established only when this relation 

 is first clearly apprehended. As the connec- 

 tions of phenomena are more widely discerned 

 the region of anomy undergoes progressive 

 limitation and the world of miracle gives 



