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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXVII. No. 947 



uable factors in all scientific method. 

 Every investigator who attempts to em- 

 ploy the proper method in measuring the 

 things of his special science, is bound to 

 be, always a critic, often a sceptic, oftener 

 still an agnostic. But every investigator 

 is also yet more imperatively bound to be 

 critical, sceptical, agnostic, in right direc- 

 tions; and toward the different conven- 

 tional opinions, and accepted conceptions 

 and laws constituting the body of that 

 science, in accordance with the varying 

 degrees of evidence and proof. 



One thing more on this point. The 

 study of man in any broad and sympa- 

 thetic way shows us unmistakably that an 

 essential element in all scientific method is 

 a certain indestructible confidence of rea- 

 son in its own ability, by repeated trials 

 and successive approaches, to reach the 

 truth of things. Man as the measurer of 

 all things is somewhat like those conceited 

 tailors to whom we are sometimes com- 

 pelled to resort in our efforts to get a per- 

 fectly fitting suit of clothes. He is always 

 trying on the coat and altering it, until he 

 has reached the limit of the cloth he has 

 sold us; and then we must be contented 

 with his assurance that it fits us perfectly, 

 while in our secret thought we are troubled 

 with the suspicion that it fits us only fairly 

 well. At any rate, for the present the 

 process of fitting can no further go. At 

 the annual meeting of the British Associa- 

 tion in 1904, there were two things, accord- 

 ing to the reports in the newspapers, on 

 which those in attendance were all agreed. 

 One of these was that they had never be- 

 fore had quite so fine a time socially; the 

 other was, that in none of the branches of 

 the association was there any one where all 

 the members were in agreement upon any 

 one thing. 



Cast a glance over the history of science 

 in general, or over the history of any one 



of the particular sciences. Those who 

 scorn philosophy under the pseudonym 

 metaphysics are fond of making merry over 

 the persistent and universal lack of agree- 

 ment on any one point, of the philosophers 

 from the beginning of reflective thinking 

 until the present time. But the simple 

 fact of history is that the more funda- 

 mental tenets of philosophy as held by the 

 different schools have been far less subject 

 to change than have the important concep- 

 tions and so-called laws of the particular 

 sciences. What enormous changes have 

 taken place in all these sciences since the 

 improved methods of studying their data 

 have gained general acceptance and been 

 put into general practise ! Each one of 

 these sciences is accustomed to boast : In 

 the last half century or less we have made 

 all things new. And with regard to the 

 future of science the words of Scripture 

 are scarcely too strong to describe its 

 apocalyptic vision : 



And I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for 

 the first heaven and the first earth are passed 

 away. 



All man's voyage on the sea of knowl- 

 edge, for the discovery, mapping out and 

 exploiting of the new domains of science, 

 is strewn with the wrecks of voyagers in 

 the distant or near past. Never before 

 were so many vagaries and visionary 

 schemes and unproved hypotheses demand- 

 ing attention and credence. But never be- 

 fore was the fleet of voyagers so numerous, 

 so competent, so sound, so sure of its fu- 

 ture, as at the present time. How can 

 such things be? How can the measurer 

 always be making such misfits, spoiling so 

 much cloth, and annoying so much his 

 patient, trustful customers, and yet retain 

 his own immeasurable self-conceit? There 

 are two reasons which establish the suffi- 

 cient answer to this question. One of these 

 is the indestructible faith of human reason 



