May 23, 1913] 



SCIENCE 



799 



Merz's eontention may be justified from a 

 purely historical standpoint, altliough, even 

 here, I have grave doubts (cf. pp. 266 f.). For, 

 the clear statement of Lotze's position (pp. 

 501 f.) amounts to a fatal criticism philosophic- 

 ally ! The single proposition — " relations which 

 endure and events that happen, imply things in 

 and between which they subsist " (p. 502) — is 

 in itself sufficient condemnation. Another in- 

 teresting feature, interesting especially to 

 scientific men, is the rehabilitation of Schel- 

 ling (pp. 453 f.), who, we are told, " deserves to 

 be looked upon as the central figure during 

 the idealistic period of German philosophy " 

 (p. 453). Now, although Dr. Merz seems to 

 me to begrudge the immense influence of 

 Hegel, he is bold enough to affirm that " Hegel 

 deserves to be looked upon as the greatest rep- 

 resentative of philosophical thought in the 

 nineteenth century" (p. 476). Of this there 

 can be no question, I think. But how this 

 conclusion, which Hegel literally wrings, as 

 it were, from Dr. Merz, is to be reconciled 

 with the primacy accorded to Sehelling is 

 hard to understand. Nevertheless, the ap- 

 preciation of Sehelling, and particularly the 

 effort to remove the misconception that has been 

 heaped upon him, was greatly in need. Omit- 

 ting many other notable matters, I would 

 simply record that the chapter on knowledge 

 is, in my judgment, the most successful; 

 while the discussion of the problem of nature 

 is the most suggestive, so much so, that it can 

 not fail to appeal to followers of the natural 

 sciences. Dr. Merz handles the vast wealth 

 of material with astonishing skill, intimacy 

 and perspicacity. 



As was inevitable in work done on so large 

 a scale, there are some few unguarded state- 

 ments. I can not but think that the tendency 

 to separate sharply between " outer " and 

 "inner" results in a false contrast (p. 12). 

 It would be much nearer the truth to say of 

 D. F. Strauss, that the issues he raised were 

 misunderstood by his own contemporaries, 

 than that " the conclusions he came to were 

 premature" (p. 169). It is doubtful, if no 

 ^ more, whether any such relation between 

 Hume and Kant as is put forward for fact 



(p. 229) could be proven historically. The re- 

 mark about psychology (p. 252) is scarcely in 

 focus. For, even granted that the old psychol- 

 ogy disappeared, we had ample compensation 

 in V olkerpsychologie and Sprachwissenschaft, 

 both traceable to the very movement which 

 Dr. Merz tends to condemn. Indeed, the main 

 defect of the " History " is to be found pre- 

 cisely in its prevalent tendency to minimize 

 this same movement. There is an astonish- 

 ing misconception of Fichte's problem (p. 

 234), and a curious comment about Spencer's 

 knowledge of Kant (p. 296), whom, as Spen- 

 cer himself informs us, he could not read. It 

 ought to be noted, finally, that the scope of the 

 work is not European. Dr. Merz really con- 

 fines himseK to the three leading nations — 

 France, Britain and Germany. The omission 

 of Italy, particularly after the work accom- 

 plished by her when her political unification 

 was won, is to be regretted. But, we should 

 not look a gift horse in the mouth. These are 

 mere blemishes, never blots, on a very remark- 

 able achievement. 



The publishers (Blackwoods, Edinburgh) 

 ought to have their share of commendation. 

 Considering the size of the volume, and the 

 elaborate notes with which it literally swarms, 

 the press work is exceptionally free from 

 errors. A letter dropped in the marginal sum- 

 mary (p. 12) ; J. F. for J. H. Tufts (p. 57 n.) ; 

 J. M. for T. M. Lindsay (p. 209 n.) ; Taylor 

 for Tayler (p. 306 n.) ; Eucken's work (p. 

 436 n.) is not a "little tract"; Thompson for 

 Thomson (p. 612 n.) — an insignificant total. 

 The index is excellent — a most important con- 

 sideration in so voluminous a performance. 

 Dr. Merz promises that, " when the fourth 

 volume appears," it " will be cancelled to make 

 place for a more comprehensive index cover- 

 ing both volumes" (p. vi). In these circum- 

 stances, I venture to append a list of errors 

 for correction then. Under De Morgan, 

 " Study of . . . Metaphysics, 576 " should 

 read Study of . . . Mathematics, 376; 

 "M'Cormick" should read McCormack; there 

 is a reference (p. 165 n.) omitted under 

 " Lexis." " Ravaisson-Mollien " is misleading. 

 Ravaisson did adopt the name of his maternal 



