June 6, 1913] 



SCIENCE 



869 



the object necessarily must be independent; 

 for such a relation is not a thing upon wliich 

 anything could depend. No less obviously 

 must the object be immanent; i. e., must at 

 the time of perception be " numerically " and 

 in all other respects identical with the per- 

 cept. For there is nothing in an external re- 

 lation which could produce duplicates or 

 " images " of the terms related. Thus the 

 root-doctrine of this new philosophy is " the 

 relational theory of consciousness," which 

 branches out into the two derivative doctrines 

 of realism and epistemological monism (i. e., 

 the doctrine that object and idea or percept 

 are one identical entity). Not only does it 

 produce these secondary conclusions; it ap- 

 parently provides their chief support. I, at 

 least, am unable to find in the volume much 

 positive argument (as distinct from proofs of 

 the inconclusiveness of certain arguments of 

 idealism and dualism) for the object's inde- 

 pendence and immanence, except deductions 

 from the relational theory of consciousness. 

 Upon the validity of this theory, then, the 

 constructive part of the new realism depends. 

 I shall accordingly limit the present examina- 

 tion of this collection of reasonings to two 

 questions : (1) What positive reasons are of- 

 fered for the opinion that consciousness is 

 merely an external relation? (2) How do the 

 new realists meet the usual arguments — -not 

 of idealism, but of common sense — for the 

 view that consciousness can not possibly in 

 all cases be an external relation, that, in 

 other words, some content of consciousness 

 must be regarded as existing only in and by 

 means of consciousness? 



1. With regard to the first point, one must 

 first of all complain that the relational theory 

 of consciousness is left, in two important re- 

 spects, in great obscurity. It still remains 

 difficult to determine just what Tcind of rela- 

 tion to what, the consciousness-relation is 

 supposed to be. So far as the authors approach 

 definiteness upon this, they also seem to di- 

 verge from one another. But I do not here 

 wish to dwell upon this consideration. More 

 serious is the uncertainty in which the reader 

 is left with respect to another question. Is 



consciousness held to be wholly and in all 

 cases non-constitutive of the content that is 

 in consciousness? Does the new realism 

 mean to reject the notion of " purely subjec- 

 tive existence " in toto, and to maintain that 

 all experiences are equally independent and 

 objective, that only things, and not thoughts, 

 exist at all? For Perry, the answer appears 

 to be negative ; this view, he observes, " is not 

 part of realism." " Values," " interests," 

 " higher complexes, such as history, society, 

 life or reflective thought," all these are " de- 

 pendent on consciousness." Independence, 

 then, is not universally predicated of things 

 experienced; all that is maintained is that 

 " in certain notable cases, at least, things are 

 none the less independent for being per- 

 ceived." But this is an immense and fatal 

 qualification of the relational theory. For if 

 consciousness is capable of having content 

 that depends upon it for existence, that is 

 purely its own, one obviously can not argue 

 from a general incapacity of consciousness to 

 constitute its own content to the conclusion 

 that the objects of perception are independent, 

 etc. The nerve of the main positive argument 

 for both realism and epistemological monism 

 is thus cut. If consciousness is in some cases 

 an external and in some cases a constitutive 

 " relation," it becomes necessary to adduce 

 specific empirical evidence to show that in 

 each and every case of perception it is of the 

 former sort. And no such evidence is oifered. 

 Strictly empirical evidence, indeed, it is mani- 

 festly impossible to offer; since things are 

 always experienced in the consciousness-rela- 

 tion, experience, at least, can not testify to 

 their independence of and externality to that 

 relation. If, then, we take the external-rela- 

 tion theory in Perry's sense — as meaning 

 merely that consciousness may he an external 

 relation — we must admit the theory to be 

 true. There are, doubtless, external rela- 

 tions ; and it is conceivable that " being in 

 consciousness " may sometimes be one of 

 them. But from this " may-be " no proof of 

 the neo-realistic theory of perception can be 

 drawn; yet no other positive proof is given. 

 Others of the group, therefore, avoid 



