June 3, 1898.] 



SCIENCE. 



781 



most widely accepted among leading psycholo- 

 gists, in preference to his own as expounded 

 elsewhere. For example, he does not attempt 

 to treat the idea as a centrally initiated sensa- 

 tion, but allows it a separate place in the anal- 

 ysis. 



The arrangement of chapters is certainly log- 

 ical, though it will probably not appear so to 

 the beginner. The complexity of the subject 

 is not adequately set forth, and (except on the 

 active side) no analysis is given, such as would 

 show the successive degrees of complexity. 

 Thus the pupil is led, first through sensation, 

 feeling and attention, then to perception, idea, 

 emotion and simple action, and finally to 

 memory, thought, sentiment and complex ac- 

 tion. Unless his attention be specially called 

 to the matter, he may easily fail to notice the 

 close relation existing between sensation, per- 

 ception and thought, or that between feeling, 

 emotion and sentiment. A general scheme of 

 these relations would have done much to clear 

 up the subject in the mind of the novice. 



The psychology of action is admirably 

 treated, considering the diflSculty of the subject. 

 In the prominence given to attention, and the re- 

 jection of innervation feelings, Professor Titch- 

 ener follows the trend of recent discussion. The 

 question of the exact relation of action to con- 

 sciousness is very properly avoided. On the 

 other hand, impulse, reflex movement, instinc- 

 tive action, etc., are thoroughly discussed, and 

 this prepares the way for a scientific treatment 

 of selective action and volition in a later chap- 

 ter. The problem of the freedom of the will, 

 which could scarcely be avoided in a volume of 

 this character, is clearly set forth, and the dis- 

 cussion limited to its psychological aspect. 



Perhaps the most noticeable departure from 

 the accepted mode of treatment is found in the 

 chapter on thought. The author makes judg- 

 ment the primary thought-process. But he ap- 

 parently limits the term 'judgment' to the first 

 instance in which any particular judgment (as 

 ordinarily defined) is made. "Judging," he 

 says, " is a process of rare occui-rence in con- 

 sciousness. * * * Every generation receives a 

 heritage of judgments from the preceding gen- 

 erations. * * * Even if we wish to judge for 

 ourselves, there are so many past judgments 



on record in books, and so many others to be had 

 for the asking from our elders, that independent 

 thought is difficult — it follows from all this 

 that propositions like ' The grass is green ' are 

 not judgments at all ; they do not express results 

 which we have gained laboriously by active at- 

 tention. That they have the form of judgment 

 may be due either to the fact that they were 

 judgments once, generations ago, or merely to 

 the fact that we cannot utter more than one 

 word at a time, and must, therefore, give the 

 parts of our idea successively. It is only when 

 * * * a total idea is actively divided up that 

 true judgment occurs." (P. 217.) "The 'ma- 

 terial ' which is worked over and divided up 

 by the attention in judgment " is the "aggregate 

 idea." "A predicate which is common to sev- 

 eral judgments is termed a concept. * * * The 

 concept is always a word." (Pp. 218-219.) 

 Again, he says : " Thinking is active imagina- 

 tion carried on in words." (P. 213.) Through- 

 out the discussion one feels that too great 

 emphasis is laid on words. Professor Titchener 

 distinguishes sharply between imagination (im- 

 aging in kind) and thought and conception 

 (symbolization in words); whereas the general 

 position of psychological text-books would 

 make it appear that the image is closely asso- 

 ciated with the word, and accompanies it, as a 

 'fringe,' at least, in every process. This is not 

 the place to discuss the theory, but it may prop- 

 erly be noted that the author departs here from 

 his own rule that the generally accepted views 

 should be adhered to in an elementary text- 

 book. 



The chapter on abnormal psychology includes 

 sleep and dreams, hypnotism and insanity. The 

 chief matters of interest to the beginner in 

 these departments are well summed up ; it 

 would be impossible to give more than a sum- 

 mary in twenty pages. In the concluding 

 chapter the province and methods of child 

 psychology, comparative psychology, etc., are 

 pointed out, and the relation of psychology to 

 ethics, logic and pedagogy touched upon. At 

 the end of each chapter throughout the volume 

 are references to passages iu other general 

 works where fuller treatment of the topics can 

 be found, while references in the body of the 

 text to physiological and physical works enable 



