836 THE GEORGE CATLIN INDIAN GALLERY. 



country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted in the first in- 

 stance and afterward sustained, if a country has been acquired and held under it, if 

 property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of 

 the laud and cannot be questioned. So, too, with respect to the concomitant princi- 

 ple that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be pro- 

 tected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed in- 

 capable of transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction may be 

 opposed to natural right and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispen- 

 sable to that system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the 

 actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and cer- 

 tainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice. 



(See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Craucli, 87 ; Mitchell v. U. S., 9 Peters, 

 711 5 Clark v. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Latimer v. Poteet, 14 Peters, 4; 

 Jackson -y. Porter, 1 Paine, 457; Blair v. Pathkiller, 5 Yerger, 230; 

 Vanhorn v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas, 304 ; Choteau v. Molony, 16 Howard, 

 203 ; Godfrey v. Beardsley, 2 McLean, 413.) 



The court confined itself to the discussion of questions essential to a 

 statement of the actual law governing the relations of the Indian tribes. 

 It assumes the concrete fact that the General Government holds the 

 right of eminent domain as well as the title to the soil in the public 

 lands, subject, however, to the right of occupancy by the Indians, and 

 tuat " the Indian inhabitants are considered merely as occupants, to be 

 protected while in i)eace in the possession of their lands, but incapable 

 of transferring an absolute title to others." The Constitution of the 

 United States gives to Congress the " power to dispose of and to make 

 all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other prop- 

 erty belonging to the United States." The "territory" or soil, here 

 classed with other property, may be disposed of under rules and regu- 

 lations prescribed by the legislative authority. The question now arises 

 whether Indian occupancy is an indefeasible right, or whether it is 

 merely a privilege which the Government may withdraw when the in- 

 terests of civilization or the pressure of immigration may demand it. 



According to the above rulings in the case of Johnson v. Mcintosh, 

 the General Government has the right to terminate the occupancy of 

 the Indians by " conquest or purchase." Does this involve the right of 

 forcibly dispossessing them of that occupancy? 



Very large portions of the public domain have been acquired by 

 peaceable purchase ; other portions have been acquired by conquest, 

 various tribes having been successively subjugated, and, as the price 

 of peace, they were compelled to part with a portion of their hunting- 

 grounds and move upon reservations. 



INDIAN HOMESTEADS. 



The fifteenth and sixteenth sections of the act of March 3, 1875, ex- 

 tend the benefits of the homestead act of May 20, 1862, and the acts 

 amendatory thereof (now embodied in sections 2290, 2291, 2292, and 

 2295 to 2302, inclusive, of the Eevised Statutes) to any Indian born 



