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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLIV. No. 1125 



other vitalistie agency "so interacts with, 

 physical conditions as to give a physical 

 result that is diverse from the result that 

 would be produced under the same ante- 

 cedent couditions without consciousness" 

 (Jennings). 



According to vitalism the formula for 

 the organic individual is either (a) the 

 dualistic formula W -\- B (W represent- 

 ing the will or vitalistie agency, and B the 

 body or physical aspect of individuality) ; 

 or, (&) the idealistic formula W(b) (W 

 representing the will or vitalistie agency, 

 and (&) the phenomenal body). 



The divergence between the mechanistic 

 and the vitalistie interpretation of individ- 

 uality is, therefore, very great, constituting 

 in fact "the greatest schism in human 

 thought. " " The vitalist sees in individual- 

 ity — personality or the self — a coordinating 

 center and synthetic activity contrasted 

 with all other agencies in nature — a real 

 creative power. While the mechanist sees 

 only what he sees in any other receptive 

 object, a center where many forces cross, 

 checking, intensifying, neutralizing or 

 transforming one another without loss or 

 addition" (Palmer, '11). 



Which of these two interpretations are 

 we to accept? Are the two views wholly 

 irreconcilable? Is the problem of individ- 

 uality, after all, an insoluble one? 



Opinions differ. The literature is vol- 

 uminous, for this is the problem of the 

 ages. Wholty unprejudiced discussion is 

 rare. Among scientific men the cause of 

 vitalism has suffered because of its associa- 

 tion historically with theological dualism, 

 while on the other hand many vitalists 

 have opposed mechanism upou the mistaken 

 belief that mechanism is identical with — 

 or demands the postulate of — philosophical 

 materialism. 



Among the divergent views expressed, a 

 few may be mentioned which are indicative 



of the trend of present opinion concerning 

 the problem of individuality — the problem 

 of vitalism and mechanism. 



Professor L. J. Henderson finds that the 

 discussion of the vitalistie problem has led 

 to the following dilemma : 



Assertion 1. — Common sense — as repre- 

 sented by those who make a study of the 

 movements of physical bodies — leads to the 

 conclusion that all physical events are sub- 

 ject to the laws of physical causation. 



Assertion 2. — Common sense — as repre- 

 sented by those who make a study of the 

 behavior of men in history — leads to the 

 conclusion that some physical events are 

 not subject to the laws of physical causa- 

 tion alone, but that will or caprice has af- 

 fected the course of historical events. 



Now since both assertions appear to be 

 equally valid in common sense experience, 

 and as both opinions can not be true at the 

 same time, and as there seems to be no im- 

 mediate prospect of their reconciliation, 

 Professor Henderson turns away his atten- 

 tion to more promising lines of investigation. 

 William MacDougall ('11) discovers the 

 same dilemma. On the ground, however, 

 that the issues involved are too important 

 to admit of neutrality, he casts in his lot 

 with the vitalists. His book on ' ' Body and 

 Mind" is a strong defense of the vitalistie 

 thesis. Other recent valuable contributions 

 to the formulation aud elucidation of the 

 vitalistie problem have been made by Ward 



('03), Driesch ('14), Biitschli ('01), 

 Palmer ('11), Bergson ('11), Jennings 



('14), Lovejoy ('09), Spaulding ('09), 

 Sumner ('10), Woodruff ('11), Eitter 



('11), Glaser (12), R. McDougall ('13), 

 R. S. Lillie (14), A. J. Balfour (79), 



Stout ('05), Lloyd Morgan ('05), Paulsen 



('95), Hoffding ('05), Haldane ('OS), 

 Ladcl ('09), Bosanquet (12), Strong 



('03), Conklin (15), Loeb (11), James 



('07). 



