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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLIV. No. 1125 



not by the vitalist. He has challenged it 

 again and again, holding that it is not 

 justified in experience. This is the argu- 

 ment of the vitalist in brief : He asserts : 



The case of vitalism is not one to be tried 

 in the court of physical science, for it does 

 not come within the jurisdiction of that 

 court, since the mechanistic formula is in- 

 adequate to life. For 



Physical science treats of only a part of 

 human experience — viz., that part of hu- 

 man experience having spatial attributes, 

 or which may be interpreted in terms of 

 matter in motion. 



But human experience includes phenom- 

 ena without spatial attributes — phenomena 

 which may not be interpreted in terms of 

 matter in motion. This is recognized by 

 the division of the sciences into the physical 

 sciences, which deal with those phenomena 

 having spatial attributes (or which are the 

 manifestations of the attributes of matter in 

 motion) ; and the mental sciences — psychol- 

 ogy and philosophy and ethics — which deal 

 more especially with non-spatial experi- 

 ence. But individuality (human personal- 

 ity) includes both classes of phenomena. 

 The court of physical science, therefore, in 

 trying the case of individuality is dealing 

 with one which does not strictly come 

 within its jurisdiction. Hence, vitalism — 

 the case of personality — now appeals to the 

 higher court of philosophy which tries cases 

 relating to the fundamental postulates of 

 both mental and physical sciences. 



But is the vitalist justified in his asser- 

 tion that physical science — mechanism — is 

 inadequate to experience? Here there is 

 decided difference of opinion. Dr. Jen- 

 nings supports the "mechanistic dogma" 

 of the universal applicability of mechan- 

 istic interpretation. For he says ( '14, pp. 

 6-5) that mechanism is a "purely descrip- 

 tive account of what is found to hold in ex- 

 perience." "There is no ground, theoret- 



ical or practical, for limiting scientific 

 treatment to diversities of any particular 

 kind (as diversities of motion)," that, in 

 other words, the field of physical science 

 includes the entire field of human experi- 

 ence. "Mechanism," therefore, is ade- 

 quate to nature and to individuality. Con- 

 sequently, if this position be taken, there 

 would appear to be no reason for continu- 

 ing the case of vitalism further. 



I am unable to discover that any consid- 

 erable number of psychologists accept Dr. 

 Jennings's assumption. On the contrary, 

 the great majority seem to agree with Pro- 

 fessor Ladd when he says ('09, p. 884) : 



Thinking and the cognitive judgment can never 

 be explained — and, indeed, the facts can not even 

 be stated — in terms of either neururgics or the 

 mechanism of presentations. 



In other words, there is doubt that psy- 

 chologists would accept the assumption of 

 Jennings of the adequacy of mechanism to 

 experience. For the same reason, his 

 further assumption — underlying his whole 

 argument — that "every diversity in con- 

 scious states is accompanied by a diversity 

 in physical conditions" may be challenged 

 as far transcending our present knowledge. 

 The vitalist may call attention to the fact 

 that Dr. Jennings assumes as the basis of 

 his argument the very point under discus- 

 sion — the question in litigation — viz., the 

 adequacy of the mechanistic formula. 



But I am of the opinion that the vitalist 

 has the best of reasons for appealing his 

 case to a higher court on the ground that 

 the basic philosophical assumptions upon 

 which his case has been argued have preju- 

 diced the case against him and have been 

 philosophically unsound. For all who 

 have discussed the case of vitalism in re- 

 lation to individuality (personality) have 

 made implicitly or explicitly philosophical 

 assumptions. Indeed, the problem of the 

 psycho-physical individual can not be dis- 



