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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLIV. No. 1125 



give the question fair, impartial and scien- 

 tific treatment. Such treatment, I am com- 

 pelled to believe, can not be given without 

 full consideration of the basic principles 

 upon which the discussion has been based. 

 Adequate treatment it can not receive 

 upon the materialistic assumption only. 

 For, as has been shown above, the adoption 

 of this postulate begs the whole question 

 under discussion and precludes the possi- 

 bility of a vitalistic interpretation of in- 

 dividuality. Therefore, if we must adopt 

 this postulate for ourselves, we ought at 

 least to present the problem as viewed from 

 the standpoint of idealism which clearly 

 admits of the possibility of the vitalistic 

 interpretation, and give our reasons for the 

 rejection of the idealistic assumption. 

 Moreover, failure to set forth the implica- 

 tions which grow out of the acceptance of 

 materialism or idealism would appear to 

 mean the omission of considerations of 

 great importance bearing on the question. 

 But above all let us rid our minds of the 

 wholly erroneous notion that the cause of 

 mechanism demands the postulate of philo- 

 sophical materialism ; and, in case we are 

 vitalists, let us free ourselves for the equally 

 fallacious belief that the mechanistic inter- 

 pretation of the physical aspect of individ- 

 uality is irreconcilable with the vitalistic 

 interpretation of life as a whole. Like the 

 Darwinian and Lamarckian hypotheses the 

 mechanistic and vitalistic hypotheses are 

 complementary and not irreconcilable 

 interpretations of individuality. 



The general purport of this paper, there- 

 fore, is well expressed in the words of Pro- 

 fessor H. W. Eand ( '12, p. 850) : 



Science Trill never solve its problems — at most, 

 it will never do more than think it has solved them 

 — unless it constantly realizes its own limitations 

 and unless it frequently assures itself of the se- 

 curity of its foundations. Now, perhaps more 

 than at any other time, the natural scientist stands 

 in need of help which may well come from the 



philosopher. Is it not timely to raise the question 

 as to the validity of the assumptions upon which 

 science rests and the integrity of the methods by 

 which we attempt to progress? 



Says Rogers ('09) : 



It is no unusual thing for human reason to 

 complete its speculative edifice in such haste that 

 it forgets to look to the stability of the foundation. 



SUMMARY 



A. The Scientific Problem of Individual- 

 ity Vitalism vs. Mechanism. — As formu- 

 lated by Jennings ('14, p. 17) the problem 

 reads : 



Is individuality a phenomenon not determined 

 by the perceptual conditions, but requiring to ac- 

 count for it the agency of a non-perceptual agent? 

 There are two historical answers : 

 1. The Thesis of Vitalism. — That "in- 

 dividuality is a phenomenon not determined 

 by the perceptual conditions only." 



2. The Thesis of Mechanism. — That "in- 

 dividuality is a phenomenon determined by 

 the perceptual conditions only." 



1. The Argument of Vitalism is based on 

 the assumption that either: 



(a) The organic individual is in reality 

 monistic, spiritual, a "Will" of "Ego" 

 having material (bodily) manifestations, 

 integrated and individualized not only by 

 a central nervous system and by hormones, 

 but (in the case of human individuality) 

 by a "Will," also. "Will" is the unique 

 characteristic of the individual (personal- 

 ity) ; 



The formula for the individual is: 

 W(b) ; or, as some vitalists assume, 



(b) The individual is in reality dual- 

 istic, a united will and body. 



The dualistic formula for the individual 

 is : W -4- B. The vitalist concludes that in- 

 dividuality (personality) is a phenomenon 

 not determined by the perceptual conditions 

 alone, but requiring to account for it the 

 agency of a non-perceptual agent. 



2. The Argument of Mechanism is based 

 upon the assumption that: 



