July 21, 1916] 



SCIENCE 



95 



The organic individual is in reality mon- 

 istic and material — a body with epiphe- 

 nomenal mental manifestations. Unity is 

 effected by means of a central nervous sys- 

 tem and hormones uninfluenced by a 

 "Will." 



The formula for the individual is B{w). 

 The mechanist concludes that individual- 

 ity (personality) is a phenomenon deter- 

 mined by the perceptual conditions alone. 

 Now, since obviously the conclusion of 

 vitalist and mechanist is not logically de- 

 duced, but simply restates the fundamental 

 assumption made, and since the conclusion, 

 therefore, is true only if the assumption is 

 true, and, since the truth of the assumption 

 is a philosophical problem. 



The Case of Vitalism vs. Mechanism 

 must now be carried to the higher court of 

 philosophy, which has jurisdiction over 

 such cases. 



We are therefore compelled to take up — 



B. The Philosophical Problem of Indi- 

 viduality — Idealism (Spiritualism) vs. Ma- 

 terialism. — What in reality is the basis of 

 individuality in organisms ? Is the individ- 

 ual a material body of various properties, 

 and nothing more? Is the basic principle 

 of life spiritual, or material, in reality? 



1. The basic assumption of mechanism 

 (materialism) is, that — The individual 

 (human personality) is in reality monistic 

 and material, a body with epiphenomenal 

 mental manifestations, and that individual- 

 ity is expressed by the formula B(w). 

 Now, since this assumption is found upon 

 analysis by philosophers to be unscientific 

 (unknowable), useless (to the mechanist as 

 well as to others), unnecessary (on logical 

 grounds) and metaphysical, and since it 

 states or interprets the known (i. e., experi- 

 ence) in terms of the unknown and know- 

 able (real substance, independent of con- 

 sciousness), this materialistic assumption is 

 rejected by modern philosophers. 



Consequently, if the opinion of experts is 

 to be respected, and if, therefore, we must 

 regard the materialistic assumption as 

 false, then we are compelled to reject the 

 conclusion of the mechanists that an inter- 

 pretation of individuality (personality) in 

 mechanistic terms alone is adequate to ex- 

 perience. For false premises mean false 

 conclusions. 



The acceptance of the idealistic (spir- 

 itualistic) assumption by modern philos- 

 ophers compels us to accept it. 



It seems necessary, therefore, to conclude 

 that the vitalist is correct in asserting that 

 not all of personality is spatially expressed. 

 In other words, 



Individuality (personality) is a phenomenon not 

 determined by the perceptual conditions only, but 

 requiring to account for it the agency of a non- 

 perceptual agent. 



This agent is the ' ' Ego " or " Will. ' ' The 

 formula of individuality therefore, is : 

 W(b), and the vitalistic theory "ist noch 

 nicht aus dem Welt geschafft." 



And, unless by caprice or prejudice we 

 refuse to trust the opinion of experts and 

 adopt a discredited philosophy as the foun- 

 dation of our thought, vitalism will con- 

 tinue to be our interpretation of individual- 

 ity in organisms, although not, of course, in 

 the mechanistic aspects of individuality. 

 H. V. Neal 



Tufts College 



literature cited 



Balfour, A. J. 1879. A Defense of Philosophic 

 Doubt. 



Balfour, A. J. 1895. The Foundations of Be- 

 lief. Longmans. 



Balfour, A. J. 1914. Theism and Humanism. 

 Doran. 



Bergson, H. 1911. Creative Evolution. Holt. 



Bosanquet, B. 1912. The Principle of Individ- 

 uality and Value. 



Brooks, W. K. 1899. The Foundations of Zool- 

 ogy. Maemillan. 



Buetschli, 0. 1901. Mechanismus und Vitalis- 

 mus. Leipzig. 



Conklin, E. G. 1915. Heredity and Environment. 

 Princeton Univ. Press. 



Crampton, H. E. 1911. The Doctrine of Evolu- 

 tion. Columbia Univ. Press. 



