582 
plants as well animals, as if they may have 
some small part of a sensitive life like my 
own”? Or are those correct who maintain 
that sensations in all organisms below the up- 
per stratum of human beings are insignifi- 
cant? 
This question can not, at present, be defi- 
initely answered and it may never be def- 
initely answered but a comprehensive com- 
parative study of the reactions of organisms 
bearing directly upon it will unquestionably 
make it possible to answer it more nearly 
correctly than can be done to-day. 
The field in this line is open. Practically 
nothing of a thorough going nature has been 
done in it. Among the best of the works on 
the lower organisms is that of Norman pre- 
sented some twenty years ago. Norman showed 
that the squirming reactions in earthworms to 
violent stimulation do not constitute con- 
clusive evidence of pain, for the simple reason 
that when a worm is cut in two the posterior 
part squirms violently while the anterior part 
with the brain does not. Reactions in other 
organisms led him to conclude that there is no 
satisfactory evidence of pain in any of the 
invertebrates. But even this work, which, as 
stated, is among the best, is far from com- 
prehensive and the conclusions are conse- 
quently only meagerly supported. 
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF REACTIONS AND PSYCHIC 
PHENOMENA 
It has become the fashion among certain 
ultra-modern psychologists to solve the prob- 
lem of consciousness by contending that it does 
not exist. This contention is no doubt largely 
verbal. The term consciousness is not very 
specifically defined. It is used loosely by 
many, and the controversy as to the existence 
of consciousness is rooted in this fact. What 
is denied by some is, as I understand it, the 
existence of an entity capable of action and 
experience independent of matter. Regarding 
this I have nothing to say. 
Practically every one who is sane, even the 
modern psychologist, admits that he is aware; 
he admits that phenomena may have a subjec- 
tive as well as an objective reference or exist- 
SCIENCE 
[N. S. Von, XLVIIT. No. 1250 
ence. Whatever else the term consciousness 
may imply it always implies awareness (sub- 
jective experience). As to the actuality of this 
phenomenon, we are, I believe, more certain 
than we are about anything else. The origin, 
the evolution and the nature of awareness, the 
processes associated with it and its relations 
to objective reality constitute, in my opinion, 
the most fundamental problems that confront 
the human mind, and all available methods of 
attack should be brought to bear upon them. 
The introspection method has been exten- 
sively used in the investigation of some of the 
problems mentioned. This method is, at pres- 
ent, in disrepute and many have abandoned it 
altogether in favor of the so-called behavior- 
method. I do not believe that the tendency to 
entirely abandon introspection is wholesome, 
although it is of but little importance in ref- 
erence to the question before us, the origin 
and evolution of reactions and consciousness, 
awareness or subjective phenomena. In the 
investigation of these questions two methods 
are promising. One might be called the com- 
parative behavior method, the other the method 
of genetics. 
The method of comparative behavior has 
been and is still beg extensively employed. 
It consists in the comparison under given 
conditions of reactions in various organisms 
including man. It is anthropomorphic in its 
tendencies and owing to this it has been 
severely criticized both justly and unjustly. 
This is doubtless due largely, if not entirely, 
to misapprehensions as to the import of the 
method. 
The method of comparative behavior was 
used almost exclusively by Lubbock, Graber, 
Romanes, Darwin and others interested pri- 
marily in the evolution of psychic phenomena. 
These investigators tried to ascertain whether 
or not this or that animal sees, hears, smells, 
tastes and feels. 
The results obtained led them, as previously 
stated, to conclude that various animals, be- 
sides man, have subjective sensation. And 
since it was generally assumed that human be- 
havior is, at least to some extent, controlled by 
subjective states, it was thought that the be- 
