586 
difficulty he merely calls in some one of his 
numerous entelechies, psychoids, vital elans 
and what-nots to settle the matter in place of 
exerting himself to trace the source of the 
difficulty to changes in material configuration. 
There probably is some truth in this conten- 
tion; but one thing is certain: that is, that not 
all vitalists are superficial experimentalists 
and slovenly observers, e. g., Mendel, Miller, 
De Candolle, Driesch, Haldane? Nor are all 
who profess to be mechanists proficient investi- 
gators. 
Personally I do not believe that there is 
necessarily any essential difference between 
the mechanistic and the vitalistic doctrines in 
so far as they may affect investigation in be- 
havior. I do not see how any one, no matter 
what doctrines he may hold, can fail to believe 
that some sequence in changes in material con- 
figurations ending in reactions have been as- 
certained, and that more such sequences can 
be ascertained, and if one believes this and 
holds that such knowledge is important, he has 
the same incentive to investigate regardless 
as to whether he is a mechanist, a vitalist or 
an agnostic. 
The fact that many series of phenomena 
have in part been ascertained strongly favors 
the mechanistic view. This doctrine rests on 
positive experimental results, while the anti- 
mechanistic doctrine is founded largely, if 
not entirely, upon negative results. But there 
are, nevertheless, some difficulties involved in 
accepting without limitation the mechanistic 
doctrine. These difficulties, it seems to me, 
should be more fully comprehended than they 
appear to be. I shall, therefore, briefly refer 
to some of them. 
Tt has often been maintained that the object 
of all scientific endeavor is the control of na- 
ture. While many hold that this statement is 
too strong, that the control of nature is not 
the only scientific problem worth while, it is 
quite generally conceded that it is among the 
most important problems. If the sequence of 
natural phenomena is known and if the prob- 
able sequence can be predicted, human activi- 
2Haldane should be classified as an anti-me- 
echanist rather than as a vitalist. 
SCIENCE 
[N. S. Vou. XLVITI. No. 1250 
ties, it is maintained, can be so adjusted as to 
fit in with the sequence of environmental phe- 
nomena, so as to reap pleasure and avoid dis- 
aster and, moreover, it is maintained that the 
sequence can be altered at will, and that na- 
ture can be made to obey the commands of 
man. “Truth makes us free,” says Brooks in 
substance, because it teaches us how to adapt 
our responses to the order of nature and how 
to alter the order of nature to meet our de- 
mands. Man has harnessed the waters and 
chained the lightning, he has bridged the 
oceans and conquered the air. Who can say 
that he has not gained control over nature? 
But does this not imply freedom and is free- 
dom not absolutely opposed to mechanism? 
Are we really free or do we merely think we 
are free? 
Mechanism implies,’ as previously pointed 
out, that every phenomenon is specifically as- 
sociated with changes in the special interre- 
lationship of material particles, masses or sys- 
tems, changes in or states in material con- 
figurations, which are absolutely determined 
by preceding changes or states in material 
configuration. Consequently, if mechanism 
holds, every phenomenon, every act of every 
organism that ever existed, exists now, or ever 
will exist, is absolutely determined with refer- 
ence to character, time and place and has been 
thus absolutely determined from the very be- 
ginning. If you can in reality, at any given in- 
stant, move your hand either to the right or to 
the left, mechanism breaks down, for accord- 
ing to the laws of mechanics, if you move your 
hand to the right, that movement is by the 
material configuration within and about you 
absolutely determined with reference to place, 
extent, duration and time and you could not 
-possibly have moved it to the left at that time. 
In discussing the question of design with 
Gray, Darwin implies that it is nonesense to 
believe, that when a swallow snaps up a gnat, 
it was designed that that particular swallow 
should snap up that particular gnat at that 
particular instant. It may be nonsense to be- 
3 The following statements, of course, apply, in 
essence, to all deterministic doctrines, antime- 
chanistic as well as mechanistic, as for example » 
Driesch’s vitalism. 
