208 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. LIV. No. 1.393 



our thinking had reached that point, we could 

 not have failed to ask ourselves the supreme 

 que.stion: What is man? 



Why have we not in these times asked that 

 fundamental question ? Doubtless it is be- 

 cause we have assumed, in the main uncon- 

 sciously, that we know the answer. For why 

 enquire when we are sure we know ? Is our 

 assumption of knowledge in this case just? 

 Have we really known, do we know now, what 

 is in fact the idiosyncrasy of the human class 

 of life? Do we critically know what we, as 

 representatives of man, really are ? Here it is 

 essential to distinguish; we are speaking of 

 knowledge ; there is a kind of knowledge that 

 is instinctive — instinctive knowledge — imme- 

 diate inner knowledge by instinct — the kind 

 of knowledge we mean when we say that we 

 know how to move our arms or that a fish 

 knows how to swim or that a bird knows how 

 to fly. I do not doubt that, in this sense of 

 knowing, we do know what human beings 

 are ; it is the kind of knowledge that a fish has 

 of what fishes are or that a bird has of what 

 birds are. But there is another kind of 

 knowledge — scientific knowledge — ^knowledge 

 of objects by analyzing them— objective knowl- 

 edge by concepts — conceptual knowledge of 

 objects; it is the kind of knowledge we mean 

 when we say that we know or do not know 

 what a planet is or what a number is. Now, 

 we do not suppose fish to have this sort of 

 knowledge of fish; we do not suppose a bird 

 can have a just conception — ^nor, properly 

 speaking, any conception — of what a bird is. 

 We are speaking of concepts, and our question, 

 you see, is this: have we humans a just con- 

 cept of man? If we have, it is reasonable to 

 suppose that we inherited it, for so important 

 a thing, had it originated in our time, would 

 have made itself heard of as a grave discov- 

 ery. So I say that, if we have a just con- 

 cept of man, it must have come down to us 

 entangled in the mesh of our inherited opin- 

 ions and must have been taken in by us, as 

 such opinions are usually taken in, from the 

 common air, by a kind of " cerebral suction." 



Well, what are the concepts of man that our 

 generation has thus inherited? Broadly 



speaking, they are of two types. One of them 

 is biological or zoological; the other one is . 

 mythological. Some of us hold the former 

 one; some of us the latter; and some of us 

 probably hold both of them; for, though they 

 are mutually incompatible, mere incompati- 

 bility of two ideas does not necessarily prevent 

 them from finding firm lodgment in the same 

 brain. According to the zoological conception, 

 man is an animal — a kind or species of ani- 

 mal. This conception has at least one merit 

 — it regards human beings as natural— as 

 creatures having a place in the scheme of 

 nature. This merit the mythological concep- 

 tion has not; according to it, man has strictly 

 no place in nature — he is indeed neither nat- 

 ural nor supernatural but is both at once — a 

 kind of miraculous union, compound, or hy- 

 brid of the two. Such, then, are the concepts 

 of man that now reign throughout the world 

 and that have so reigned from time immemo- 

 rial. And such are the concepts that have 

 fashioned our so-called human or social sci- 

 ences in so far as these have been and are 

 fashioned by what we humans consciously or 

 unconsciously think man is. 



Are the concepts true? Or rather we must 

 ask — since they can not both of them be 

 true — is one of them true ? 



It should not amaze us to find that both are 

 false; for the concepts are man's and their 

 object is man; thus the difficulty is unique; 

 it is that of a self-conscious being having to 

 regard its kind as an object and rightly con- 

 ceiving what the object is. In respect of the 

 mythological conception, there are no doubt 

 some who are disposed to treat it ironically as 

 only the other day it was treated by Plato, 

 for example. " We must accept," said he, " the 

 traditions of the men of old time who affirm 

 themselves to be the offspring of the gods — 

 that is what they say — and they must surely 

 have known their own ancestors. How can 

 we doubt the word of the children of the 

 gods ? Although they give no probable or cer- 

 tain proofs, still, as they declare that they 

 are speaking of what took place in their own 

 family, we must conform to custom and be- 

 lieve them." But this gentle irony — the way 



