580 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLVI. No. 1198 



the law of conservation of energy is one of 

 the most conspicuous examples. The other 

 term has a similarly wide range of mean- 

 ing, but it stands most commonly either 

 for a secret process which leads to riches 

 by way of patent offices or for enterprises 

 in which the institution is supposed to act 

 as a complaisant disbursing agency. 



In dealing with these aberrant types 

 there are encountered certain other fallacies 

 of a more specioiis and hence of a more 

 troublesome character. They arise out of 

 the prevailing innocence of, if not con- 

 tempt for, the doctrine of probabilities. 

 The simplest of these fallacies is seen in 

 the common belief that one mind is as likely 

 as another to make discoveries and advances 

 jn the realms of the unknown. Thus it is 

 assumed that research establishments 

 should maintain experts, or corps of them, 

 for the purpose of promoting the efforts of 

 tyros, amateurs and dilettanti, or, in other 

 words, perform the functions of elementary 

 schools. A subtler fallacy is expressed in 

 the more common belief that a research or- 

 ganization should occupy itself chiefly in 

 soliciting and in examining miscellaneous 

 suggestions. It is held that if these are re- 

 ceived in large numbers and if they are 

 read long enough and hard enough, the 

 possibilities of knowledge will be completely 

 compassed. This has been elsewhere called 

 the process of ' ' casting dragnets in the wide 

 world of thought . . . with the expectation 

 ,that out of the vast slimy miscellanies 

 thus collected there will be found some 

 precious sediments of truth." It is, in- 

 deed, a metaphysical method of extracting 

 truth out of error. The worst of all these 

 fallacies is found in the not unpopular no- 

 tion that if experts could be set at work 

 under the direction of inexperts great 

 progress could be achieved. This is the 

 fallacy so often used to justify placing 

 technical work under the administration of 



politicians and promoters rather than 

 ,under the charge of competent men. It 

 .finds frequent expression also in sugges- 

 tions to the institution that its corps of in- 

 vestigators might avoid the dangers of 

 "respectable mediocrity" by yielding to 

 the requests of the less conservative and 

 more brilliant advocates of advancing 

 knowledge. 



But what, it may be asked, are the char- 

 acteristics which differentiate these pseudo- 

 scientists from normal investigators? 

 They are well defined and not numerous. 

 The pseudo-scientist is in general excess- 

 ively egoistic, secretive, averse to criticism, 

 and almost always unaware of the works 

 of his predecessors and contemporaries in 

 the same field. He displays little of that 

 caution which is born of adequate knowl- 

 edge. He is lacking especially in capacity 

 to discover and to correct his own mistakes. 

 He is forever challenging others to find 

 errors in his work. He has an overween- 

 ing confidence often in formal logic, but is 

 unable to see that this useful device may 

 play tricks by bringing him, for example, 

 simultaneously to right and to wrong con- 

 clusions by reason of wrong premises. His 

 worst defect is manifested in asking for 

 and in expecting to get more lenient con- 

 sideration in the forum of demonstration 

 than that accorded to his more modest but 

 more effective competitors. 



How inadequate are the hasty popular 

 estimates of these exceptional individuals 

 is sufficiently witnessed in the extensive ex- 

 perience of the institution. In the brief 

 interval of its existence it has had to deal 

 with about 12,000 of them. Many of these 

 have been commended to the institution in 

 terms well calculated to set aside the laws 

 of biologic continuity and thus to elevate 

 the aspirants abruptly from irreproach- 

 able respectability to questionable fame. 

 To some of them have been attributed quali- 



