March 10, 1922] 



SCIENCE 



249 



objective or subjective, all that is cognizable 

 and recorded in the realm of human experience 

 or as a natural phenomenon; in brief, what is 

 Fact and Evidence, useful in the endless 

 struggle to perfect human relations individually 

 or collectively in the pursuit of all that con- 

 cerns a higher and more effective standard of 

 life, labor, and social happiness. 



The principle is laid down as incontrover- 

 tible that most of the ills from which mankind 

 suffers are the result of chaos and confusion in 

 the boundless domain of knowledge and the 

 misunderstanding of the why and wherefore of 

 life in the higher and larger sense. This ap- 

 plies as much to the earning of a livelihood 

 or success in commerce and trade as to the 

 affairs of nations and questions of peace and 

 war. A League of Nations not based upon 

 completely organized and unified knowledge is 

 as foredoomed to failure as a merchant ad- 

 venture in ignorance of the market to which 

 it applies. Yet less progress has been made in 

 the direction of organizing the data of human 

 experience on the basis of a well-considered 

 plan than has been made in the case of any 

 other single branch of science or business en- 

 terprise. Of the collection of data there is no 

 end, nor of the accumulation of books and the 

 making of card indexes; but this is often not 

 an aid but rather a hindrance to the organiza- 

 tion of knowledge in the sense and for the pur- 

 pose indicated. It is largely due to this defect 

 in the Baconian philosophy that the practical 

 results of Bacon's theories fall so far short of 

 their theoretical possibilities. In the same 

 sense it is a safe statement to make that the 

 practical value of a public library at the pres- 

 ent time is but a fraction of its possible utility 

 were it properly conceived on the jarinciples 

 of organized knowledge. 



It was the opinion of Herbert Spencer that 

 "The. sciences can not be arranged rationally 

 in a serial order." Yet numerous have been 

 the attempts to classify the sciences from Ba- 

 con and Spencer to modern workers, including 

 the fragmentary observations of Mercier. Per- 

 haps the most useful remarks on classification 

 are those of Jevons in the second volume of 

 his "Principles and Science," but in this as in 



all similar discussions the true objective, the 

 organization of knowledge, is lost sight of. 

 Nearer to the point are Spencer's data on 

 Sociology but wholly impractical for every- 

 day needs, being rather a classification of in- 

 formation than of knowledge or verifiable evi- 

 dence. 



Nor is the question much advanced by such 

 a learned work as "The Organization of 

 Thought" by Professor Whitehead, although it 

 is properly observed that "first-hand knowl- 

 edge is the ultimate basis of intellectual life," 

 and the further and extremely interesting and 

 practically valuable conclusion that "The see- 

 ond-handedness of the learned world is the 

 secret of its mediocrity. It is tame because it 

 has never been scared by facts," and finally 

 that "The main import of Sir Francis Bacon's 

 influence does not lie in any j)articular theory 

 of inductive reasoning which he happened to 

 express, but in the revolt against second-hand 

 information in which he was the leader." 

 (p. 43). 



This is precisely the point raised in this pro- 

 test against the apathy of the so-called scien- 

 tific mind, which is often satisfied with doubt- 

 ful or incomplete information because for- 

 sooth it is a task of colossal difficulty to collect 

 and properly organize the information on al- 

 most any subject whatever. But the diffleulty 

 arises chiefly out of an unorganized or dis- 

 organized state of mind, habituated to a pre- 

 tense of knowledge full well known to be im- 

 perfect and incomplete. The defects or deflci- 

 encies are therefore often made up by the use 

 of mathematics, by every conceivable method 

 of abstract reasoning as a substitution for the 

 want of sufficient concrete evidence which more 

 systematic and qualified research would bring 

 forth. 



Completely unified knowledge, from the 

 viewpoint of Spencer, is unattainable in any 

 field of human endeavor, but the approximately 

 complete organization of the knowledge ex- 

 tant on any particular subject at the present 

 time is not only feasible but an imperative 

 duty. The use of mathematics is, under such 

 circumstances, more of a hindrance and a pre- 

 tense than a help. What is wanted is more 



