250 



SCIENCE 



[Vol. LV, No. 1419 



and better understood control of organized in- 

 formation. 



The organization of knowledge involves as 

 a first consideration the synthetic collection of 

 facts, and a fact in the present sense is con- 

 strued as defined by Webster, as "Anything 

 that is done or happens, as an act or deed, 

 anything actually existing, and anything 

 strictly true." But aside from this narrow 

 definition of facts in the more restricted sense 

 the organization of knowledge involves as a 

 secondary consideration the collection and 

 elassifleation of information, which may or 

 may not be strictly true but of relative value 

 sufficient for the purpose. Information is de- 

 fined as "knowledge acquired or derived, or as 

 timely specified knowledge, sufficient for the 

 ordinary needs of life and the basis of the 

 large majority of judgments upon which human 

 conduct is regulated." To these preliminary 

 definitions must be added the term knowl- 

 edge itself or "the clear and certain appre- 

 hension of the truth or assured rational con- 

 viction." This is not knowledge in the or- 

 dinary sense of the term, for we know much 

 of what is not clearly apprehended at all. As 

 said by Webster, "Knowledge is all that the 

 mind knows, from whatever source derived or 

 obtained or by whatever process; the aggregate 

 of facts, truths, or principles acquired or re- 

 tained by the mind, including alike the intui- 

 tion pative to the mind and all that has been 

 learned respecting phenomena, causes, laws, 

 principles, literature, etc." 



With these principles clear in mind the task 

 of the organization of knowledge is less diffi- 

 cult. It is imm.aterial what subject is selected; 

 the Seal Fisheries of Alaska or the Climatic 

 Conditions of the Falkland Islands; The De- 

 velopment of the Esport Trade in the Basin 

 of the Amazon River or The Theory, Practice, 

 and Results of Insurance. The process of or- 

 ganizing the facts of any branch of knowledge 

 is the same however much the nature of the 

 data may vary, or their extent in time and 

 place. Facts must first be looked upon as in- 

 formation — as mere knowledge irrespective of 

 intrinsic worth; they are the raw material 

 which, subjected to qualified critical and im- 



partial consideration, forms the ground work 

 of science inductively conceived. Science has 

 been defined as "Knowledge gained and veri- 

 fied by exact observation and correct think- 

 ing," and also as the sum of universal knowl- 

 edge, or in other words "an exact and systematic 

 statement of knowledge concerning some sub- 

 ject or group of subjects." Now a systematic 

 statement of knowledge is organized knowl- 

 edge, and in this sense much of what is called 

 scientific falls far short of the required essen- 

 tials of a true science. Webster's definition is 

 admirable but of itself incomplete. For it 

 would seem of the first importance to emphasize 

 the need of organized knowledge as a concep- 

 tion of science in the more restricted sense of 

 the word. 



This must have been recognized by Webster, 

 who goes on to qualify his definition of science 

 as follows : "Knowledge of a single fact not 

 known as related to any other, or of many 

 facts not known as having any mutual rela- 

 tion, or as comprehended under any general 

 law, does not reach the meaning of science," 

 for, he adds, "science is knowledge reduced to 

 law and embodied in a system." This process 

 is primarily one of organizing the data of 

 scien.ce and of subsequent classification and 

 analysis, out of which the principles of science 

 are logically evolved by a process of pure in- 

 duction. It is held that this process of or- 

 ganization aiming at complete unification of the 

 knowledge of any particular subject or group 

 of subjects is as yet but very imperfectly 

 realized in the manner most conducive to prac- 

 tical results. 



In other words, the objective of organizing 

 knowledge is the accessibility of facts useful 

 for the purpose of selection for particular and 

 practical purposes. In the words of M. Poin- 

 care, "Scientists believe that there is a hierarchy 

 of facts and that a judicious selection can be 

 made," and furthermore that "The most in- 

 teresting facts are those which can be used 

 several times, those which have a chance of 

 recurring." He then asks the question "Which 

 then are the facts that have a chance of re- 

 curring?" and he replies that in the first place 

 simple facts "although facts which appear 



