46 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. II., No. 23. 



the reader for the voyage before him. With- 

 out this, much that is to come might appear 

 meaningless, or at least lose its point. 



"Men think in systems. Most s^'stematie 

 treatises are unintelligible unless followed 

 from the beginning and grasped in their en- 

 tiretj'. A fundamental tone runs through 

 them which prescrilses the special sense of 

 everjr line, and which is whollj* unheard in 

 isolated passages. The careful reader of such 

 works, without necessarily acquiescing in the 

 author's views, is able at least to comprehend 

 them and to do justice to them." . . . 



"In the following argument, now to be 

 briefly- stated, and subsequently to be fully 

 elaborated, the statements made in this chap- 

 ter, as well as those contained in the preced- 

 ing volume, are to be taken as the basis, or 

 premises, and must be granted ' for the sake 

 of the argument ' at least, however unsound 

 thej' may be deemed in themselves." 



Elsewhere the theorj^ is more fullj' elabo- 

 rated, that the more complex sciences can be 

 grasped onlj- as the more simple sciences upon 

 which they are based are pjroperlj' understood, 

 and that anthropologic sciences in general 

 must rest firmly upon p)hysics and biology. 

 Though the reader may differ from Mr. Ward 

 in relation to his classification and conclusions, 

 he will still be interested in the symmetry of 

 his sj'stem and the perspicuity, of his presen- 

 tation. 



The essential principle running through the 

 treatise is, that progress in societj^ is based 

 ui:on the struggle for happiness in the same 

 manner as biologic progress is based upon the 

 struggle for existence. It is therefore a new 

 system, in radical contrast with that taught in 

 our schools and enunciated by the majority of 

 publicists of the present daj-, of whom Her- 

 bert Spencer is the chief. For this struggle 

 for happiness the term ' conation ' {conari, to 

 endeavor) is used, taken from Sir AVilliam 

 Hamilton ; aud he saj'S, " The term ' conation ' 

 will be emploj-ed in this work to represent the 

 efforts which organisms put forth in seeking 

 the satisfaction of their desires, and the ends 

 thus sought will be designated as the ' ends of 

 conation.' " 



Again, the author classifies phenomena as 

 genetic and teleologic. Genetic phenomena 

 are such as appear in series, with natural ante- 

 cedents and consequents, unaffected bj' design 

 or purpose. Teleologic phenomena do not 

 appear in natural series, the antecedents being 

 phj-sical phenomena controlled bj' design ex- 

 isting in mind, and the consequents being 

 the purposes for which the will is exercised. 



Throughout the work these two classes of phe- 

 nomena are clearlj- distinguished ; but it is 

 impossible, in a brief review, to set forth fully 

 the importance of the distinction, as the author 

 himself has done. In general terms, it may 

 be stated that biologic progress is due to the 

 struggle for existence, and involves genetic 

 phenomena ; while sociologic progress is due 

 to the struggle for happiness (conation), and 

 involves teleologic phenomena. 



"All progress is brought about by adapta- 

 tion. Whatever view we may take of the 

 cause of progress, it must be the result of a 

 correspondence between the organism aud the 

 changed environment. This, in its widest 

 sense, is adaptation. But adaptation is of 

 two kinds. One form of adaptation is pas- 

 sive or consensual, the other form is active or 

 previsional. The former represents natural 

 progress, the latter artificial progress. The 

 former results in a growth, the latter in a 

 manufacture. The one is the genetic process, 

 the other the teleological process. In passive 

 adaptation the means and the end are in im- 

 mediate proximity, the variation takes place 

 bj- infinitesimal diflTerences ; it is a process of 

 differentiation. In active adaptation, on the 

 contrarj', the end is remote from the means ; 

 the latter are adjusted to secure the former 

 by the exercise of foresight; it is a process 

 of calcidation." 



By the term 'dynamic sociology,' as used 

 by the author, is to be understood a systematic 

 treatise on the forces which impel mankind 

 into social relations, to develop social organi- 

 zation, and to provide and modify the insti- 

 tutions of society. The subject-matter of 

 dj-namic sociolog}', appearing in the second 

 volume, is arranged in the following order, as 

 set forth by the author : — 



" The remainder of this work will chiefly 

 consist in the discussion of six terms ; and 

 therefore, before entering upon such discus- 

 sion, it is a primarj' necessitj' to furnish rigid 

 definitions of each of these terms. 



' ' For a purpose which will preseutlj' appear, 

 we will assign to each of these terms a letter, 

 which will fix their order in a series not ad- 

 mitting of anjf alteration. 



" The first of these terms, which we will 

 designate by the letter A, is happiness; the 

 second, which we will designate by B, is prog- . 

 ress; the third, which we will designate by C, 

 is dynamic action; the fourth, which we wiU 

 designate hy D, is dynamic opinion f the fifth, 

 which we will designate by E, is knmuledge; 

 and the sixth, which we will designate by F, 

 is education. 



