Jur.v 13, 1883.] 



SCIENCE. 



47 



" The delinitions of these six terms are as 

 follows : 



"A. Happiness. — Excess of pleasure, or 

 enjo3"mcnt. over pain, or discomfort. 



" B. Progress. — Success iu harmonizing 

 natural phenomena with human advantage. 



" C. Dynamic action. — Employment of the 

 intellectual, inventive, or indirect method of 

 conation. 



" D. Dynamic opinion. — Correct views of 

 the relations of man to the universe. 



" E. Knowledge. — Acquaintance with the 

 environment. 



" F. Education. — Tniversal distribution of 

 extant knowledge. 



" Corresponding to these six terms thus 

 defined, there are six theorems of dynamic 

 sociology, wiiich require to bp elaborated and 

 established, and to each of which a separate 

 chapter will be devoted. 



"Continuing the literal designations, these 

 theorems are the following : — 



" A. Happiness is the ultimate end of cona- 

 tion. 



'"• B. Progress is the direct means to happi- 

 ness ; it is, therefore, the first proximate end 

 of conation, or primary- means to the ultimate 

 end. 



" C. Dynamic action is the direct means to 

 progress ; it is, therefore, the second proxi- 

 mate cud of conation, or secondary means to 

 the ultimate end. 



"D. Dynamic opinion is the direct means 

 to dynamic action ; it is, therefore, the third 

 proximate end of conation, or tertiary means 

 to the ultimate end. 



" E. Knowledge is the direct means to 

 dynamic opinion ; it is, therefore, the fourth 

 proximate end of conation, or fourth means to 

 the ultimate end. 



" F. Education is the direct means to knowl- 

 edge ; it is, therefore, the fifth proximate end 

 of conation, and is the fifth and initial means 

 to the ultimate end." 



The remaining six chapters of the work, 

 namely, chapters ix., x., xi., xii., xiii., xiv., 

 treat of tiiese six subjects seriatim. 



In chapter ix., then, the doctrine is set forth 

 that happiness is the ultimate end of conation, 

 or human endeavor. Here Jlr. AVard discusses 

 the nature and genesis of feeling, as the proper 

 basis of a philosophic sjstem involving the 

 interests of man ; and he subsequently en- 

 deavors to show, that, what function is to 

 biology, feeling is to sociology. And after a 

 discussion of the intellectual method as com- 

 pared with the physical method of conation, 

 and several collateral subjects, he sets forth 



the doctrine that degree of feeling is con- 

 comitant with degree of organization, and that 

 the pursuit of happiness by man leads to 

 higher physical, mental, and social organi- 

 zation ; that, in turn, such higher organization 

 increases feeling, and thus increases pleasure, 

 and thus increases happiness. 



Ciiapter x. is devoted to the consideration of 

 progress as the primary means to happiness, 

 and includes : a discussion of the difference be- 

 tween dynamic sociology and moral science ; 

 then a discussion of the growth of the means 

 for communicating ideas, — language in all its 

 forms ; then of the arts and industries which 

 are developed in the pursuit of subsistence ; 

 then the origin of government and the institu- 

 tions of government ; and, finally, the origin 

 and institutions of religion. 



Chapter xi. is entitled 'Action,' — a term 

 chosen in preference to the more couuuon ex- 

 pression, conduct. The chapter is chiefly de- 

 A oted to the discussion of a systematic classi- 

 fication of actions, first, as involuntary and 

 voluntary ; and voluntary actions are again 

 divided into impulsive or sensori-niotor, and 

 deliberative or ideo-motor. Each of the latter 

 classes consists of two groups ; namely, actions 

 possessing moral quality, and actions devoid 

 of moral qualit}'. 



It is no part of the author's purpose to treat 

 of action possessing moral quality ; although, 

 in order to make clear the irrelevancy of such 

 actions to his discussion, he occupies some 

 space in going over the ground usually covered 

 by writers on ethics. Actions devoid of moral 

 quality are those upon which progress essen- 

 tially depends, and chiefly that branch which 

 falls under the more general head of delibera- 

 tive or ideo-motor actions. They are further 

 subdivided into static and dynamic, the former 

 group embracing the great bulk of human 

 activities in the performance of the ordinary du- 

 ties of life. Static actions of this class do not 

 result in progress, Init tend simply to preserve 

 the existing social status. Dynamic actions 

 constitute the really progressive class of actions. 



The chief fact which distinguishes dynamic 

 actions from all others is, that they are per- 

 formed by the indirect or inventive method. 

 All the progress that has taken pl.ace in society 

 has been due to such action. However spon- 

 taneous such progress may aiipear, it has, 

 nevertheless, been the result of telcologic meth- 

 ods in adjusting natural phenomena in such a 

 manner that they will accomplish desired ends, 

 — remote in themselves, but foreseen by the 

 intelligence of the developing intellect. The 

 results are the essential elements of human 



