48 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. II., No. 23. 



art ; and consequently' civilization is fundamen- 

 tallj- and whollj' artificial. Here Mr. Ward 

 introduces a series of illustrations of tj-pical 

 dj-namic actions performed in the course of 

 social progress, for the purpose of elucidating 

 the central idea which he desires to embodj' in 

 the term ' dynamic action.' 



Chapter xii. is a discussion of opinion as 

 the direct means to progressive action. As 

 dj'namic actions are ideo-motor, such actions 

 must result from the possession by the agent 

 of certain undcrlj-iug and directing ideas. 

 The truism that ' ideas rule the world ' simply 

 means, that opinions determine actions. But 

 in order to produce dj-namic actions, — -that 

 is, actions which will, in fact, result in progress, 

 — it is essential that the opinions which under- 

 lie them be in rigid harmony with objective 

 reality. Dynamic action can onlj- flow from 

 correct opinion. 



Opinions must not only be correct, the}' 

 must be important. Unless important, no 

 appreciable dj'uamic result will flow therefrom. 

 The most important opinions, or ideas, are 

 arranged under four general heads : first, cos- 

 mologic ideas ; second, biologic ideas ; third, 

 anthropologic ideas ; fourth, sociologic ideas. 

 Correct ideas belonging to these four great 

 classes constitute the primar}' motive power to 

 all human progress. 



Chapter xiii. is upon knowledge, — the im- 

 mediate data of ideas. Opinions cannot be 

 directly reached. They are not subject to the 

 will, either of the partj' holding them or of any 

 other : the}' are simpl}' consequents. Obviously, 

 the antecedents of ideas consist in the data 

 possessed b}' the mind relative to the mate- 

 rials and phenomena of nature. Such data are 

 grouped hy the author under the general term 

 ' knowledge. ' Knowledge, therefore, must first 

 exist ; and, if it exist, no efibrt need be expend- 

 ed in determining opinion. In this chapter 

 the author shows that the chasm which in fact 

 separates the intelligence of the lowest and 

 the highest classes of mankind is chiefly due 

 to inequality in the possession of the data for 

 thought. He shows that the capacity of the 

 mind is, in any particular class of society, prac- 

 tically equal ; that, even in what are known as 

 semi-civilized or barbaric races, the capacit}' 

 exists for a far greater amount of knowledge 

 than is ever obtained. 



Chapter xiv. is on education as the direct 

 means to knowledge. The possession of 

 knowledge, therefore, if it could be secured, 

 would constitute the true means to the proxi- 

 mate end, and thus secure the ultimate purpose. 

 But the human mind is so constituted that it 



cannot be safelj' intrusted to secure this end 

 for itself; for the individual cannot understand 

 the necessity for this knowledge, or guide 

 himself wiseh" in its attainment, prior to its 

 acquisition : that is, the period of acquisition 

 is in the earlier years of the life of the indi- 

 vidual, when he must be guided by others. 

 The initial means in the entire series is there- 

 fore education, activelj' considered as a func- 

 tion of society. 



The work closes with a condensed but fun- 

 damental treatment of the general subject of 

 popular education, in which appears a review 

 of the various theories that have been held, and 

 that still control human action on this subject. 

 He divides the general body of public opinion 

 into five parts, which he denominates ' the five 

 kinds of education.' These are: first, edu- 

 cation of experience ; second, of discipline ; 

 third, of culture ; fourth, of research; fifth, of 

 information. The first four of these kinds 

 of education are considered for the purpose 

 of showing, that, however important in them- 

 selves, they are insufficient to accomplish the 

 great end of securing an artificial civilization 

 as the product of direct social action. The 

 last of these forms of education, therefore, is 

 the onl}' one which embodies such promise. 



The author sees little hope in the imperfect 

 and desultory attempts of indi^'iduals to secure 

 this great need in societj-. To render it of any 

 value, he claims that education must be the sj'S- 

 tematic work of society in its organized capa- 

 citj'. Ceasing to exert itself longer in vain 

 attempts to secure directly the various proxi- 

 mate ends, societj- should vigoroush- adopt this 

 inital means, and concentrate its energies on the 

 work which is clearly practicable, — that of fur- 

 nishing to all its members the data actually- in 

 its possession. 



Under the heading ' Matter of education ' 

 the author briefly, but without dogmatism, dis- 

 cusses the general theorem that the subject- 

 matter should be a knowledge of nature, — a 

 knowledge of the environment of the individ- 

 ual and of mankind. His treatment of the 

 methods of popular instruction is brief, main- 

 taining that this is merely a matter of supply- 

 in the politico-economic sense, which will cer- 

 tainlj' come as soon as there shall be an ade- 

 quate demand. He says, " The methods and 

 the teachers have always been as good as the 

 popular notions of education, and thej- will 

 doubtless continue to be so." The onl}- crite- 

 rion which he does lay down with regard to 

 method is that it be teleologic. He insists that 

 education, like ever}' other department of civili- 

 zation, must be an artificial product ; that it 



