310 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. ir., No. 31. 



little more deflniteness of philosophic thought, 

 for just a little more acquaintance with the his- 

 tory of the subject, and, in general, for just a 

 little more strengtli. But we must not be too 

 exacting. This is the work of a student of a 

 special science. He comes with suggestions 

 that have been a good while in maturing ; he 

 expresses himself in clear language, with great 

 and generally successful effort at fairness ; and 

 he shows no small ingenuity. His book will 

 do good both to theological and to scientific 

 students if they read it. And it can do no 

 harm to philosoph}'. Such discussion is, in 

 fact, so timely that one cannot wish that the 

 book had been kept anj' longer out of print ; 

 but one must wish that the author had begun 

 to study the history of thought a good deal 

 earlier. Achilles at the trench will always be 

 a sublime figure ; but the lack of armor is not 

 just that feature in the situation of Achilles 

 which it is safest for other^ people, at other 

 trenches, to imitate. 



The argument from design, sa3's the author, 

 is in fact twofold. In one form it is teleo- 

 logical. Certain events or things are judged 

 to be intended for certain purposes. This 

 argument has less signifiance for the men of 

 to-day than it had for former generations. 

 The advance of science throws it somewhat 

 into the shade. But the advance of science 

 itself tends to bring into clearer light the other 

 design argument. This is the argument from 

 the order of nature. Order, it maintains, im- 

 plies intelligence, is itself a mark or sign of 

 mind. The more order we discover, the more 

 intelligence is indicated in the world. This 

 does not necessarily mean that we infer intel- 

 ligence as the cause of order ; but it means 

 that we regard order, however it may actuall}- 

 be connected with intelligence, as a mark of 

 intelligence. This argument needs a name ; 

 and Mr. Hicks proposes to call it the eutaxio- 

 logical argument, to distinguish it from the 

 teleological. 



The teleological argument alone is not satis- 

 factory. To prove that anj- thing implies in- 

 telligence as the cause whereby it was adjusted 

 to an end, you must know what the end or 

 purpose of this thing is. And to do this, you 

 must know that there are ends or purposes for 

 things at all ; but to assume that you know 

 this is to beg the question. Teleologically, 

 therefore, intelligence as the cause of things 

 cannot be proven ; but onlj- particular adjust- 

 ments, made by an intelligence already known 

 to be the cause of things, can be teleologieall.y 

 discovered. Teleologically j'ou could at best 

 show, that, if there is intelligence in connection 



with the world as a whole, then this intel- 

 ligence works for certain special aims. But 

 teleologicall>' it would be impossible, without 

 aid from some other source, to make certain 

 that any mind at all is associated with the 

 world as a whole. It is impossible ' to prove 

 the existence of intelligence l\y means of the 

 definite direction given to intelligence,' because 

 the existence of intelligence ' must be assumed 

 in order to ascertain its direction.' 



On the other hand, maintains our author, the 

 eutaxiological argument escapes the analogous 

 objection. Teleology has to assume the exist- 

 ence of purpose, in order to use it as a proof 

 of intelligence. But eutaxiology has not to as- 

 sume the existence of order. Order is the first 

 and last word of natural science ; and from first 

 to last science continues to deepen the mean- 

 ing, and to widen the application, of the word 

 'order.' The difflcultj' of the eutaxiologist 

 begins not at this point, but later. Are we sure 

 that order is a sign of intelligence ? An orderly 

 arrangement of things is a mark of intelligence 

 in many cases. " Suppose we find smooth 

 stones or shells on the beach, arranged at 

 regular intervals in a straight line, or in three 

 straight lines to form a triangle : we should 

 say that an intelligent being had done this" 

 To be sure, in this case we should suppose 

 that some man had done it ; but that would 

 not affect the matter, for, "if we saw such 

 figures upon the moon or upon any of the 

 planets, we should at once conclude that the}^ 

 were inhabited bj' intelligent beings." Thus 

 in these cases, reasons Mr. Hicks, order is 

 inductivel3- connected bj^ us with intelligence. 

 " We see intelligence producing orderly re- 

 sults ; and we project the inference thence 

 derived over those cases of orderly' phenomena 

 of which we do not know the cause." But 

 what is done in special cases of order observed 

 in forms or in groupings of objects, ought 

 fairl}- to be done in regard to the whole of 

 nature ; and that especially because every case 

 of orderl3- connection that we find, and that 

 suggests intelligence, is found not alone, but 

 itself in connection with other cases, so that 

 we could not flnallj^ stop with our examination 

 of one case of order before we should know 

 its connections with the whole of the rest of 

 the universe. The more, then, we know of 

 nature, the more orderly and connected does 

 it seem, and the more reason we have to apply 

 our induction to the world as a whole. 



All this, of course, implies no definite view 

 about the way in which intelligence is con- 

 nected with the order of the universe. Whether 

 it be that arbitrary collocations of matter are 



