September 7, ISP:).] 



SCIENCE. 



311 



the iniincflinte sources of the order, or whether 

 the ohUm- follows from the fiindaiucntal prop- 

 erties of matter, the result, is the same. And 

 for a like reason eiitaxiolog}" has nothing to 

 say of divine altril)utes over and above intel- 

 telligence. Eutaxiology docs not even by 

 itself prove the existence of Gotl. It simply 

 proves that intelligence exists in the universe. 

 It leaves to other proofs the discussion of 

 other divine attributes. Eutaxiology having 

 proved intelligence, teleology can then be used 

 to prove that this intelligence is somehow 

 associated with will and power, and works 

 (through evolution or otherwise) for definite 

 aims ; and other proofs may be used for other 

 purposes. In conclusion, why may not the 

 various theistic arguments agree to divide 

 labor, and combine the outcome, so that each 

 one shall undertake to prove just that divine 

 attribute to whose defence it is especially fitted ? 

 Thus confusion might be avoided, and the 

 cause of natural theology advanced. Mr. 

 Hicks even goes so far as to suggest, in a very 

 generous outburst (p.' 389), that possibly that 

 despised creature, the outological proof, might 

 find some kind of mission in the midst of 

 his desired association of theistic arguments. 

 The ontological proof, having very long been 

 able to saj', — 



" I lie so composedly now in my bed. 

 That any beholder might fancy me dead," — 



must regard the kindness of Mr. Hicks with 

 very mixed emotions. He thinks that it might 

 be 'just the thing to supplement ' the others. 

 But during its natural life the ontological proof 

 used to think that the others might possibly 

 be of use to supplement itself. 



Such, then, is our author's own line of 

 argument. Between the introiluction and the 

 liual exposition of this argument, lie inserts a 

 discussion of the history of design arguments. 

 This is a mere collection of notes, with more 

 or less ingenious reflections that suggested 

 themselves to the mind of the collector here 

 and there in the course of his work. The 

 'Natural theology of the Greeks and Romans ' 

 is treated in some thirty pages, which arc 

 devoted to Socrates, Cicero, and (laleu. 

 How, one may ask, would it look for one to 

 head a chapter with the title ' The astronomy 

 of modern times,' and then to treat the subject 

 by briefly expounding some statements of 

 Galileo, Lord lirougham, and Dr. Whewell? 

 Thirty pages u)ight well be the limit allowed 

 by the plan of our author ; but such a space is 

 not too limited for a really connected historical 

 sketch, with some attention to the perspective 



in which every man's thought ought to be 

 viewed. The author's account of Spinoza is 

 similarly imperfect, because uo effort has been 

 made to see what the man, with his odd, 

 crabbed method, really had in mind. We are 

 told, what we all knew before, that Spinoza's 

 method is unsuccessful ; Imt, for the rest, we 

 learn more in this chapter al)out Mr. licwes 

 than about .Spinoza. ' Keiraarus,Kant. Hume, 

 and Held ' are somewhat embarrassed to find 

 themselves side by side in one chapt'er ; and 

 poor Kant especially is ra.ade to speak as he did 

 in 17(53, instead of being allowed to present 

 himself as he does in the ' Critique of pure 

 reason,' nearly twenty years later. Although 

 this error is in just this discussion not so 

 serious as the corresponding error would be in 

 expounding otiier parts of Kant's doctrine, 3'et 

 the method is unhistorical ; and the residt is, 

 that, in summing up, Mr. Hicks hopelessly 

 confuses Kant's lire-critical and critical periods. 

 In short, our author shows himself in general 

 no historian of ihonght. Throughout the 

 whole sketch, there is a lack of a sense of the 

 development of thought. P2ach man's notions 

 stand beside his neighbor's, as if the philoso- 

 phers were all siieakers in a debating-club. 

 And Mr. Hicks, as intelligent listener, adds 

 his applause and his comments in brackets, 

 and is not afraiil to express himself with even 

 boyish freedom of speech. But he is always 

 good-humored, and his criticisms often hit the 

 mark very well. Yet it is to be hoped that 

 nobody will undertake to judge the history of 

 natural theology on the basis of this account. 

 Now as to the result. What shall we saj' 

 of eutaxiology? We have no hesitation in 

 declaring the argument, as our author presents 

 it, an altogether defective one. For, as he 

 presents the eutaxiological argument, it is an 

 inductive argument, and solely inductive. If 

 we saw a triangular arrangement of objects on 

 the moon, we should conclude that some intel- 

 ligence had done this. We should extend the 

 known associatioti of intelligence and order, 

 as we find it about us, to cases of order more 

 remote from our direct observation. We 

 should conclude that order is a sign of intel- 

 ligence, even where we have no other evidence 

 of the i)resence of intelligence. So reasons 

 Mr. Hicks. But is this sound? And, tirstris 

 the author's suggestion about the supposed 

 geometrical figure seen on some planet a 

 correct one? Should we, if we saw such a 

 figure on some planet, at once conclude that 

 intelligence had caused it, or was in any way 

 associated with it? .Surely not everybody 

 would feel the force of such an induction. 



