312 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. II., No. 31. 



Most scientific astronomers, observing sncli a 

 regular figure for the first time, would at once 

 look for some ordinarj' physical explanation 

 of its presence, even as they now try to 

 explain tiie shapes of the planets ; and, failing 

 to find such an explanation, they would be 

 content to call the triangle a mystery. Only 

 some man whose position as a public lecturer 

 on astronomy demanded that he should have 

 a new sensation ready for each new lecture- 

 season would be apt to insist on the existence 

 of some set of geometricallj' disposed plan- 

 etarj' giants. More sober people would be 

 content with an ignoramus. But how mucli 

 less satisfactory becomes such an induction 

 when applied to the whole of nature ! At best 

 would not such an argument be lilvc the induc- 

 tive reasoning of a man, who, having already 

 learned the modern doctrine of the relation of 

 tlie colors of flowers to the habits of insects, 

 should for the first time, and without any pre- 

 vious knowledge of marine zoology, find a 

 colored shell by the sea-shore, and who should 

 then at once expect to find some race of insects 

 in some analogous relation to the inhabitant 

 of this shell ? Or, again, if one extended even 

 to the rainbow, or to the sunset, an explanation 

 derived from the case of colored flowers, and 

 their relations to insects, would not the 

 argument possibly be no more absurd than the 

 induction upon which Mr. Hicks lays so much 

 stress ? Men and beavers and other creatures 

 make orderly groupings of things. Hence 

 order impHes intelligence, and that wherever 

 we find order. Is this argument any better 

 than the old teleology ? Mr. Hicks is deceived, 

 it would seem, by the vast wealth of facts to 

 which his argument" appeals. He neglects the 

 difticulty of bringing such various facts within 

 the control of an induction that has for its 

 narrow basis such intelligent activity as we 

 see about us among men and animals. As 

 induction, pure and simple, eutaxiology seems 

 to us simply worthless. 



But is the order argument in any form there- 

 fore worthless? Certainly not. Mr. Hicks 

 does fine service in bringing before the public, 

 just at this moment, a thought that is by no 

 means new, and that is profoundly suggestive. 

 'What does the order in the world imply?' 

 This is a great question, not of inductive 

 science, which is concerned solelj' with dis- 

 covering the actual order itself, but of general 

 philosophy. And Mr. Hicks is, we doubt not 

 at all, quite right in saying that order implies 

 intelligence. But how, and what intelligence? 

 Such questions he leaves wholly nnanswered. 

 The critical philosophy of Kant would, strictly 



speaking, affirm that order in the world imiilics 

 only the intelligence of tlie thinking subject 

 to whom the world appears. The world is 

 orderly, because onlj' as orderl3- could it be- 

 come known to an intelligent being. Not the 

 world in itself, but the world for thinking 

 beings, is to be viewed as orderly. This view 

 would make short work of our author's ' in- 

 duction,' but it would not satisfy him. He 

 would then need to know and build beyond 

 Kant. In short, Mr. Hicks has verj- ingeniously 

 set his reader down at the beginning of a great 

 philosophic problem. It would argue a lack 

 of intelligence in the reader if he did not seek 

 to bring his thoughts into a better order than 

 that in which Mr. Hicks will have left them ; 

 and the author's service lies in making it im- 

 possible for an inquiring mind to rest content 

 with what is here ofl'ered to him. This, how- 

 ever, at least, he has very well suggested, 

 though he has not proved his suggestion : viz., 

 that the postulate of natural science is the 

 rationalitj' of the world. "Whether we find 

 order, or onl}' seek it in nature, we are always 

 a priori sure that the world is actually- full 

 of connections that admit of expression' in 

 rational terms, of explanation to an intelligent 

 mind. And so we assume a fundamental like- 

 ness of nature and intelligence that suggests 

 to ns very stronglj' some kind of real unity 

 or identity of nature and intelligence. But 

 whether this suggestion has any ground, 

 whether this identit3- of nature and mind is 

 to be accepted at all, or is to be accepted in 

 Kant's sense only, or in Berkelej''s sense, or 

 in Hegel's sense, or in some other sense, this 

 is a matter for philosophj- to discuss. We 

 thank Mr. Hicks for having shown afresh the 

 necessity for such discussion. His eutaxiol- 

 ogy is not so original as he thinks ; but his 

 offering on the altar of philosophy' deserves 

 the reward due to every gift that a speci.nl 

 student of natural science finds time to oflfer 

 in the true spirit of calm investigation. 



MAYNARD'S MANUAL OF TAXIDERMY. 



Manual of laxidermi/ ; a complete guide in collectinfj 

 and preserving birds and mammal.i. By C. J. 

 Maynard. I3oston, 5. E. Cassino Sf Co., 1883. 

 16+lllp.,illustr. 12°. 



A REALLY complete guide in collecting and 

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