634 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. II., No. 40. 



the archean to the base of the bird's-eye limestone 

 was found to be of great interest. At Glen Falls, 

 Essex, Ausable Chasm, and Chazy, N.Y,, sections 

 ■were taken, and collections formed. 



The sections taken at Highgate Springs, Swanton, 

 St. Alban's, and Georgia, Vt., by Professor Jules 

 Marcou, were critically examined, and large collec- 

 tions of fossils secured. The data obtained show 

 the dip of the Winooski marble series and the slates 

 above, carrying the Olenellus fauna, to be the same. 

 The five hundred feet of magnesiau limestone, with 

 its interbedded arenaceous layers, conformably under- 

 lie the Olenellus beds. The fauna at the Georgia 

 locality was increased by the addition of eight species 

 not before reported as occurring there. 



NOTES AND NEWS. 



Mr. H. M. Stanley contributes to the New-Eng- 

 lander an interesting, and, on the whole, clearly writ- 

 ten study, entitled 'Evolution as bearing on method 

 in teleology.' The essay follows a train of thought 

 somewhat similar to the one stated in a book that 

 appears almost at the same time, aud that we reviewed 

 recently; viz., Mr. Hicks' s Critique of design argu- 

 ments. Mr. Stanley is thankful to the doctrine of ev- 

 olution for having rid teleology of a useless and some- 

 what dangerous argument, — the argument from mere 

 in-norance; i.e., from our incapacity to explain cer- 

 tain singular or wonderful things save by supposing a 

 jjowerful being directly working to produce them. 

 This argument, which covers, on the whole, much 

 the same ground as is covered by what Mr. Hicks 

 calls teleology in the narrower sense, is regarded by 

 Mr. Stanley as superseded by the doctrine of evolu- 

 tion. We now see that nature ought to be regarded 

 as a ' practically infinite series of second causes ; ' so 

 that, if we are now ignorant of the cause of any phe- 

 nomenon, we still have a right to expect to find for 

 it hereafter a purely natural cause. Every thing has 

 CTrown" and we have to view nature as a vast and 

 perfect machine, self-supplying, self-regulating, and 

 not needing any workman to stand by to watch the 

 steam-gauge, to put in the material, or to oil the 

 bearings. Tet this view is not atheistic, according 

 to Mr. Stanley; for th,e supposition of a designing 

 intelligence remains, only this intelligence is ' imma- 

 nently behind phenomena.' By this being, all things 

 consist. In fact, the more nearly automatic the ma- 

 chine, the more perfect the contriving intelligence. 

 "If an automatic locomotive-machine is a sign of 

 very great intelligence, how much greater intelli- 

 gence would an automatic universe-machine exhibit ? 

 . . . Teleology has been called a ' carpenter theory,' 

 but a teleology which views the universe as a practi- 

 cally infinite automatic machine would forever destroy 

 the force of any such epithet." In other words, as 

 we understand Mr. Stanley, a ' practically infinite ' 

 carpenter would he something much better than a 

 carpenter; and teleology gains rather than loses when 

 the doctrine of evolution shows that the carpenter's 

 tinkering of his work, if there is any tinkering, is 

 practically infinitesimal. All this seems to us not at 



all novel; but, for the most part, it is very well put, 

 and worth saying. 



But when we inquire of any of these evolutionary 

 design arguments, not how they defend themselves 

 against the charge of .atheism, but how they demon- 

 strate theism, we are disappointed. Sir. Hicks, as 

 we saw in reviewing him, is very definite on this point 

 as to what he attempts, and as to what he does not 

 attempt; but his definiteness only serves to show his 

 weakness. He declares that order, as such, is proof 

 of intelligence, but adds that the proof is solely 

 inductive. Men are orderly because they are intelli- 

 gent: hence nature, if orderly, must be somehow 

 associated with intelligence. We answered this in- 

 duction by asking whether all brilliantly colored 

 odjects must needs be visited by insects merely be- 

 cause the colors of flowers depend upon their relations 

 to the habits of insects. But with Mr. Stanley we 

 hardly have room for so definite a criticism; for, 

 though his argument in favor of theism, in so far 

 as he suggests one at all, seems to be inductive, it 

 seems also most carefully to shun any such definite 

 statement as should make it definitely answerable. 

 The vast machine needs, it would seeni, a controlling 

 intelligence, which does not interfere with it, and yet 

 does somehow direct it. The ' pr.actically infinite 

 series of second causes ' is not enough by itself, and 

 we must somehow get outside of it to find a designer; 

 and, when we ask how the designer is related to the 

 series of second causes, we get the charmingly inno- 

 cent answer, that he is 'immanently behind phenom- 

 ena,' — an expression that seems to us either mere 

 words, or else an excellent Irish bull. Perhaps Mr. 

 Stanley can explain this phrase for us; but mean- 

 while, as one casts about for an interpretation, one 

 is reminded strongly of Brer Fox, in the wonderful 

 tar-baby story, as he ' lay low ' in the bushes, watch- 

 ing his creation the tar-baby while it slowly intrapped 

 Brer Rabbit. Possibly Brer Fox was ' immanently 

 behind ' that tar-baby. But our criticism is only of 

 bad arguments and of obscure expressions, not of the 

 view itself that the order of the universe implies an 

 intelligence. The latter we hold as positively as Mr. 

 Hicks or Mr. Stanley, only y,-e insist that the question 

 is not in the least one of inductive science. The 

 ' design ' argument in all its .accustomed forms is bad, 

 because it is an inductive argument, applied as true 

 empirical science never applies any inductive argu- 

 ments; viz., to matters wholly beyond the limits of 

 phenomenal existence. The whole question is one 

 of philosophy. Not as a result of induction, but as an 

 implied premise of the inductive, or of some other 

 rational thinking process, must this doctrine of intelli- 

 gence in nature be established, if at all; and therefore 

 only a critical philosophy, that examines the assump- 

 tions lying at the basis of the thinking processes, has 

 any business with the question. Empirical science, 

 as such, has simply once for all ' no need of that 

 hypothesis.' 



— A fire broke out liist week in the cellar of the 

 building containing the geological collections at Am- 

 herst college. Fortunately it was discovered early, and 

 put out by the students before any serious damage 



