Maech 14, 1919] 



SCIENCE 



255 



classed as "poorest" decreased steadily 



from 80 per cent, in D — to 11.5 per 



'cent, in A. 



In an infantry regiment of another camp 



were 765 men (regulars) who had been 



with their oflficers for several months. The 



company commanders were asked to rate 



these men as 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 according to 



"practical soldier value," 1 being highest 



and 5 lowest. The men were then tested, 



with the following results: 



(a) Of 76 men who earned the grade A 

 or B, none was rated "5" and only 9 

 were rated "3" or "4." 

 (V) Of 238 "D" and "D— "men, only 

 one received the rating "1," and onlj' 

 7 received a rating of "2." 

 (c) Psj^hological ratings and ratings of 

 company commanders were identical 

 in 49.5 per cent, of all cases. There 

 was agreement within one step in 88.4 

 per cent, of cases, and disagreement of 

 more than two steps in only .7 per 

 cent, of cases. 

 Pig. 6 exhibits a striking contrast in the 

 intelligence status and distribution of 

 "best" and "poorest" privates. The per- 

 sonal judgment data for this figure were 

 obtained from sixty company commanders 

 who were requested to designate their ten 

 "best" and their ten "poorest" privates. 

 Of the "poorest," 57.5 per cent, graded 

 D or D — ; less than 3 per cent, graded 

 A or B. The results suggest that intelli- 

 gence is likely to prove the most impoi'tant 

 single factor in determining a man's value 

 to the military service. 



In one training camp excellent oppor- 

 tunity was offered to compare a group of 

 soldiers selected on the basis of low mili- 

 tary value with a complete draft quota. 

 In the "low value" group there were 147 

 men, in the complete draft quota 12,341 

 men. The distributions of intelligence rat- 

 ings for these two military groups appear 



as Fig. 7, from which it is clear that if all 

 men with intelligence ratings below C — 

 had been eliminated, the "low value" 

 group would have been reduced by at least 

 half. 



In a certain training camp 221 inapt 

 soldiers, belonging to a negro regiment of 

 Pioneer Infantry, were referred bj' their 

 commanding officer for special psychological 

 examination. Nearly one half (109) of 

 these men were found to have mental ages 

 of seven years or less. The army neverthe- 

 less had been attempting to train these 

 men for military service. In justice to the 

 Psychological Ser\nce it should be stated 

 that these negroes had been transferred 

 from camps where there were no psycholog- 

 ical examiners. For this reason they had 

 not been examined before being assigned to 

 an organization for regular training. 



In another instance some 306 soldiers 

 from organizations about to be sent over- 

 seas were designated bj' their commanding 

 officers as unfit for foreign service. They 

 were referred for psj-chological examina- 

 tion with the result that 90 per cent, were 

 discovered to be ten years or less in mental 

 age, and 80 per cent, nine years or less. 



It has been discovered that when soldiers 

 are assigned to training units without re- 

 gard to intelligence, extreme inequalities in 

 the mental strength of companies and regi- 

 ments appear. This fact is strikingly ex- 

 hibited by Figs. S and 9, of which the 

 former shows the proportions of high grade 

 and of illiterate or foreign soldiers in the 

 various companies of an infantry regiment. 

 Compare, for example, the intelligence 

 status of C and E companies. The former 

 happens to have received only 3 per cent, 

 of A and B men along with 38 per cent, of 

 illiterates and foreigners, the latter received 

 by contrast 29 per cent, of high grade men 

 with only 9 per cent, of men who are as a 

 rule difficult to train. It is needless to at- 



