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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLI. No. 1054 



a concrete instance, if I may be indulged 

 for a mention of names: Here are Terkes 

 and Watson who have been worl^ing ap- 

 proximately the same time with the same 

 problems and materials and attaining the 

 same conclusions in their chosen field. But 

 recently, when they came to the applica- 

 tion of methods to human psychology, one 

 makes much of imagery and of introspec- 

 tion in general, as much as the most ardent 

 introspectionist could wish, while the other 

 denies the existence of imagery except for 

 the sake of argument in a few sporadic 

 cases. If one assume the attitude of the 

 average man and argue from behavior to 

 consciousness, it is evident that while 

 Yerkes has a large amount of concrete 

 imagery, probably dominantly visual, Wat- 

 son has relatively little concrete imagery, 

 and what he has is of the motor type. An 

 assumption of this sort on the basis of 

 behavior alone, if we are to include 

 writing psychological treatises under be- 

 havior, is of course not to be compared in 

 value with a few minutes' introspection, 

 but may be ventured as a guess. If this 

 holds, not only is consciousness and even 

 imagery an essential determinant of be- 

 havior, but it is possible to show that one 

 important bit of the behavior of the man 

 who would most emphatically deny the 

 existence of imagery is due to imagery or 

 its lack. To ascertain that one does not 

 have imagery is just as much a contribution 

 of introspection as to determine that it 

 exists. To give over introspection alto- 

 gether is to abandon the method that has 

 given much if not most of the body of 

 knowledge that we have at present and to 

 insist that we use only a method that so 

 far has been little tried, and which, in the 

 form that is suggested, the inference of 

 mental states from slight movements, has 

 when tested proved relatively futile. 

 If one broaden slightly the term con- 



sciousness and the implication of introspec- 

 tion it seems possible to put the problem of 

 psychology in a form that removes all 

 ground for complaint on all sides. This is 

 to include in consciousness and among ideas 

 the fundamental states upon which all 

 effective mental life depends. More imme- 

 diate than the image, more certainly made 

 out than any slight movement, is the series 

 of assurances that we have that certain 

 events, subjective or objective, take place. 

 We know that we recall, we are sure that 

 we recognize, believe, see objects, that we 

 are pleased, desire certain things, and are 

 on the point of striving for them. These 

 assurances are common to the man who has 

 images and to the man who has none, to 

 the man who believes that mental life is 

 fundamentally sensory and to him who 

 regards it as altogether motor, to the real- 

 ist and to the idealist. They might be called 

 mental states, or mental functions, had not 

 both been spoiled by use. It is the mind of 

 the practical man before he does any the- 

 orizing. It is likewise the starting point of 

 the psychologist. He begins to deal with 

 images and with slight movements only 

 when he becomes sophisticated, and when 

 he becomes sophisticated he forgets his 

 starting point and substitutes his explana- 

 tion of consciousness in terms of images, 

 movements, or pure thought for the funda- 

 mental reality. In time he assumes that 

 the explanation instead of the fact is the 

 reality, just as the naive man assumes that 

 memory, attention, will and self are imme- 

 diately known realities. 



My plea is that the real subject-matter of 

 psychology is the fact that we attain con- 

 clusions, that we perceive distance, that we 

 are prepared to act, rather than the im- 

 agery, or the movements that accompany, 

 precede or succeed. This group of facts 

 common to all schools may be explained in 

 different ways or need not be explained at 



