Makch 19, 1915] 



SCIENCE 



429 



emphasis whicli lie lays on applied psychology. 

 Each of these aspects of the subject is devel- 

 oped at eonsiderahle length. 



The main body of the work is devoted to 

 scientific psychology; but even here the treat- 

 ment is out of the ordinary. We miss the 

 usual detailed description of the nervous sys- 

 tem and end organs. The author expresses his 

 conviction in the preface that details from 

 accessory sciences such as anatomy do not 

 belong in an outline work on psychology. On 

 the other hand, he believes that psychology 

 should embrace social as well as individual 

 phenomena, and accordingly several chapters 

 are devoted to an examination of mental proc- 

 esses in the social group. Professor Miinster- 

 berg does not venture into the field of animal 

 psychology, but he gives considerable promi- 

 nence to " behavior " in the human sphere. 

 In this connection he points out that tools are 

 human extensions of the motor end-organs, 

 while language is a highly specialized motor 

 function, comparable however with other forms 

 of motor activity. 



After defining the scope of psychology in 

 two opening chapters, the author proceeds to 

 the scientific description and explanation of 

 mental events. This aspect of the subject he 

 terms causal psychology, to distinguish it from 

 the purposive treatment which follows. More 

 than half of the volume is devoted to the 

 causal presentation, which for most writers 

 constitutes the whole of scientific psychology. 

 This part of the work is exceptionally clear 

 and readable. One is reminded of the au- 

 thor's late colleague, William James, whose 

 interesting style and picturesque illustrations 

 add much to the value of his classic text. 



It is to be regretted that Professor Miinster- 

 berg has not imitated his predecessor's fullness 

 of treatment as well. In endeavoring to com- 

 press his material within too narrow limits 

 he is compelled to curtail the discussion of 

 certain topics unduly. For example, one would 

 desire a more exhaustive examination of 

 imagery, discrimination, abstraction and rea- 

 soning than the volume supplies. In this part 

 of the work the author insists on a thorough- 

 going scientific procedure. His psychological 

 analysis rests on a rigid psychophysical basis 



and he aims at a complete mechanistic explana- 

 tion of mental phenomena through the physio- 

 logical processes which accompany them. 



Professor Miinsterberg classifies the ele- 

 mentary psychophysical processes under four 

 heads: stimulation, association, reaction and 

 inhibition; the complex processes include per- 

 ception, ideas, activity, inner states and per- 

 sonality. A striljing feature here is the group- 

 ing of actions, attention and thought processes 

 together under the head of activity. Inner 

 states are divided into simple feelings of pleas- 

 ure and displeasure, emotions, and esthetic and 

 intellectual attitudes. 



The transition from individual to group 

 processes is made through the study of race, 

 sex, age and individual differences. It may be 

 questioned whether such variations do not be- 

 long more properly to comparative than to 

 social psychology; but as the author points 

 out, the differences among individuals facil- 

 itate their grouping into social unity. The 

 social grouping itself depends upon three ele- 

 mentary processes : union, submission and 

 aggression. These factors work together and 

 result in the complex social processes of organ- 

 ization and achievement. 



The second part of the work is devoted to 

 purposive psychology. Here the object is not 

 to describe the inner life, but to understand 

 its meaning. By a curious volte-face the 

 author discards the scientific explanation of 

 mental phenomena which he has hitherto in- 

 sisted upon rigorously, and considers only 

 their teleological bearings. Psychology re- 

 garded from this standpoint is " entirely re- 

 moved from the world of describable ob- 

 jects and understood as an account of those 

 functions in the personality which point be- 

 yond themselves and are felt as deeds of the 

 subject" (46). In connection with this 

 change to the subjective standpoint Professor 

 Miinsterberg renames the facts themselves. 

 Instead of psychical elements we have experi- 

 ences; instead of perception we have immedi- 

 ate reality; ideas become meaning, activity 

 becomes the will. 



It is somewhat difficult to grasp the signif- 

 icance of this transformation. Granting that 

 a plexus of ideational elements may be called 



