430 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLI. No. 1055 



meaning, and that a certain plexus of activ- 

 ities constitutes will, the scientist may still 

 question the propriety of abandoning the asso- 

 ciational basis of meaning or ignoring the 

 causal sequence of volitional acts, as Professor 

 Miinsterberg appears to do. 



In other sciences the speculative hypotheses 

 which have stood the test of criticism have 

 been attempts to amplify or reconstruct the 

 principles discovered by the science itself, 

 rather than to deny its fundamental generali- 

 zations. Professor Miinsterberg's reconstruc- 

 tion of psychology, on the contrary, starts out 

 by repudiating the generalizations based on 

 observed temporal sequences, and assuming 

 that the acts of our inner life are not contained 

 in time (301), that "our mental life is free" 

 (296). 



It would appear that the author makes al- 

 together too crucial a distinction between 

 cause and purpose. His interpretation of 

 both terms is open to challenge. The analysis 

 of the purpose concept has never been fully 

 carried out, but at least we know that " pre- 

 vision " and " activity toward an end " admit 

 of biological interpretation in harmony with 

 mechanistic principles. As for causality, the 

 author's use of the concept is not in harmony 

 with Hume's classic analysis, which demon- 

 strated that " necessary " connection is not an 

 essential feature of the causal sequence. 



Science to-day generally accepts Hume's 

 conclusions. The chemist and physicist re- 

 gard the laws of their sciences as merely gen- 

 eralized statements of observed facts. They 

 distinctly refuse to commit themselves as to 

 whether causal sequences must be as they ac- 

 tually are. Since Darwin's time most biol- 

 ogists have interpreted the evolution of species 

 and the stages of individual development in 

 the same way. Scientific expl^ination at the 

 present day does not seek to impose anthropo- 

 morphic compulsions upon nature. Nature 

 has been found to be self -consistent in the past; 

 the scientist assumes that the same seK- 

 consistency will be observed in the future. 

 The generalized notion of uniformity and self- 

 consistency is all that is implied in the scien- 

 tific conception of law. 



Professor Miinsterberg interprets the term 

 " law " as involving a " necessary connection " 

 between phenomena. For example, if we have 

 met a man and heard his name, " the law of 

 association makes it necessary that if we meet 

 the man again his name comes to our mind " 

 (22). The author states specifically that 

 " the scientist has a right to claim that all his 

 laws are meant as expressions of causal neces- 

 sity" (31). Yet this necessary connection is 

 just what most physical scientists plainly dis- 

 avow. They aim merely to generalize the uni- 

 formities of sequence observed in nature. 



In any science it is quite legitimate to sug- 

 gest a working hypothesis which goes beyond 

 the facts and reconstructs them. The electron 

 theory and Mendeleeff's periodic law are such 

 reconstructions of physical and chemical data. 

 So in psychology Professor Miinsterberg may 

 find grounds for his theory of " self as a 

 system of purposes." But such a theory should 

 be based on scientific foundations. Instead 

 of two standpoints, the causal and purposive, 

 we should have systematic description of men- 

 tal phenomena and a suggested reconstruction ; 

 the latter should amplify the empirical laws, 

 instead of rejecting them. 



The author's attempt to formulate a system 

 of psychology from the teleological standpoint 

 will not appeal to the plain empirical psychol- 

 ogist, because it runs counter to the scientific 

 development of the subject. It transcends the 

 scientific limitations of both cause and pur- 

 pose. " Necessity " is an anthropomorphic 

 addition to causality. Failing to find any such 

 necessary connection between mental events, 

 the author throws his science to the winds and 

 bases his teleological reconstruction on an 

 equally anthropomorphic interpretation of 

 purpose. The result is perplexing. It is not 

 easy to attach a definite meaning to such 

 statements as " the free act is free because it 

 has no causes" (324). Nor can we take a 

 definite attitude toward the assertion that " we 

 can not imagine a purposive act the meaning 

 of which is not a negation of an opposite pur- 

 pose" (316). 



In the third part of the volume Professor 

 Miinsterberg returns to more familiar terri- 



