OcTOBER 6, 1899.] 
BOOKS RECEIVED. 
Einfuhrung in die Chemie in leichfassliche Form. 
LassAr-CoHn. Hamburg and Leipzig, Leopold 
Voss. 1899. Pp. xii-+ 299. M. 4. 
Qualitative Analysis for Secondary Schools. CyRus W. 
IrisH. New York, Cincinnati and Chicago, Ameri- 
can Book Co. 1899. Pp. 99. 
Laboratory Exercises, with Outlines for the Study of 
Chemistry. H. H. NICHOLSON and SAMUEL AVERY. 
New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1899. Pp. vi+ 
134. 60 cents. 
The Hygiene of Transmissible Diseases. A. C. ABBOTT. 
Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders. 1899. Pp. 311. 
SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS AND ARTICLES. 
The American Naturalist for September opens 
with ‘A Contribution to the Life History of 
Autodax lugubris Hallow,’ by Wm. E. Ritter 
and Loye Miller, followed by an account of 
‘The Worcester Natural History Society,’ by 
Herbert D. Braman. The third of the very 
useful ‘Synopses of North American Inverte- 
brates,’ is by J. S. Kingsley and deals with the 
Caridea; and N. R. Harrington who this summer 
sacrificed his life in order to study Polypterus, 
contributes a valuable article on its life habits. 
The ‘ Pads on the Palm and Sole of the Human 
Fetus’ are discussed by R. H. Johnson who 
considers them homologous with the walking 
pads of some mammals. Among the topics dis- 
cussed by the editor is that of ‘New Species,’ 
many of which are considered to be founded on 
very trivial characters. 
DISCUSSION AND CORRESPONDENCE. 
NATURALISM AND PHILOSOPHY. 
“Had men in the discoveries of the natural world, 
done as they have in the intellectual world, involved 
all in the obscurity of doubtful and uncertain ways of 
talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, 
theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and 
disputed, nay, ships built and fleets sent out, would 
never have been taught us the way beyond the line, 
and the antipodes would still be as much unknown 
as when it was declared heresy to hold there were 
any.’’ 
In a discussion, in the current number of Sct- 
ENCE of my criticism of Ward’s Naturalism and 
Agnosticism, it is intimated that my ‘harshness’ 
may, perhaps, be due to irritation by Ward’s 
SCIENCE. 
497 
castigation of Spencer. I therefore wish to say 
that Iread this with interest andsympathy, and 
found it by far the most valuable part of the 
book; but as Ward’s method of treating the 
Synthetic Philosophy isan old story to zoolo- 
gists, I saw no reason to review it for readers of 
SCIENCE. 
As I understand Ward’s reasoning on this 
subject, I fully agree with it, and should my- 
self put it in these words: It is not by general- 
ization and abstraction, but by discovery, that 
knowledge is advanced ; but the first principles 
of this philosophy are based upon abstraction 
and generalization and can add nothing to 
knowledge. 
Zoologists have long been aware that they 
who, in past generations, sought to advance our 
knowledge of living things by generalizing 
them, or referring them to genera, hindered the 
progress fof zoology, which began to advance 
with rapid strides as soon as naturalists per- 
ceived that our only source of knowledge of 
living things is the study of the living things 
themselves. So far as it concerns the zoologist, 
Ward’s method of handling the works of the 
author of ‘ The Principles of Biology’ is ancient 
history—a record of a fight that was fought out 
fifty years ago. 
Passing, then, to another topic, I ask space 
for a few quotations which seem to have a bear- 
ing upon the assertion by my critic that Ward’s 
book is ‘ wrought out in sympathy with scien- 
tific methods.’ 
Ward says, II., 44.—‘‘Granted that we are 
only ‘entitled to say that the dice actually do 
fall, when they are thrown from the box, not 
that they must fall; granted that we may only 
say that their after course is entirely and abso- 
lutely the result of the initial conditions, not 
that it must be ; still this is enough. * * * On 
the naturalistic assumption * * * matter and 
energy are indestructible and ingenerable, and 
the laws of their working rigorous, exact and 
unalterable.’’ 
It is not the naturalist, but the philosopher, 
who asserts that the dice will fall. The natural- 
ist expects them to fall, but expectation, how- 
ever well founded and reasonable, is not fatal- 
ism. Naturalism knows nothing of determinism. 
It does not assert that the after course of the 
