NOVEMBER 24, 1899. ] 
tion of epistemology to metaphysics, in so far 
as it crops out, seems to me to be of a distinc- 
tively dogmatic character; dogmatic in the 
pre-Kantian sense. But this criticism, as Dr. 
Smith, and everybody else must be aware, de- 
pends greatly on point of view. And for myself, 
I am unable to see how epistemology and meta- 
physics can be disjoined as they appear dis- 
joined here; especially, I must demur strongly 
to Dr. Smith’s pronounced tendency to substi- 
tute epistemology for metaphysics in relation to 
some fundamental problems. I am aware that 
this is a popular direction at present ; but this 
only emphasizes its temporary character. 
The central portion of the work consists of a 
plain, straight-forward consideration of what 
might be called the law of homology, in some 
of its psychological aspects. ‘Like is known 
by like,’ and therefore, ‘sympathetic imitation’ 
must be regarded as the main and most ade- 
quate method of knowledge. Throughout this 
discussion the proper problem of epistemology, 
that of the relativity of human knowledge, is 
submerged, and a factor in experience, which 
no one would seek to deny, but which falls es- 
sentially within the purview of psychology, is 
put forward as if it furnished at once the ideal 
and the method. Knowledge is defined as 
“‘the presence in the mind immediately, or in 
copy of that which constitutes objects’’ (35), 
evidently on the tacit understanding that this 
position does not involve dualism, with its re- 
sultant scepticism. Just before enunciating 
this definition, Dr. Smith sums up the merits 
and defects of other theories of knowledge, with- 
out suspecting, however, that the emphasis on 
the one hand, between subject and object as 
different, and on the other, the stress on self- 
knowledge can be traced to an ultimate re- 
lativity, a datum, if you please so to call it, 
which is at once the justification of the exis- 
tence of epistemology and the source of its 
problem. The dualistic implications of Dr. 
Smith’s standpoint make themselves felt, and 
naturally, allthrough. Towards the close they 
at length become quite explicit. ‘‘It is the 
function of knowledge to equate itself with its 
object ’’ (266) ; and on the next page, Dr. Smith 
quotes, with apparent approval, Mr. Spencer’s 
declaration, ‘‘ the perception of relations is not 
SCIENCE. 
773 
the perception of the things themselves.’’ Pro- 
vided ‘ perception’ be taken in the same sense 
in both clauses, can such a form of words be 
said to express anything thinkable by man? 
Just because epistemology is a science with a 
problem and a solution for it, things cannot be 
set over against relations and apart from them 
in this airy fashion. 
Although the book is not an epistemology 
and even illustrates a kind of philosophical 
backsliding, sporadic now, it presents its good 
points. The chapter on ‘Sympathetic Imitation 
in Art’ contains some admirable reflections ; 
the fatality of hurried systematization is pressed 
home well, and the entire argument is marked 
by the presence of an all-round culture very re- 
freshing in these days of one-eyed specializing. 
As has been indicated, Dr. Smith has not em- 
braced the inviting opportunity to contribute 
an authoritative work in English to epistemol- 
ogy. He has done appreciable service, never- 
theless, by entering a series of caveats which 
some eager spirits would do well to bear in 
vivid remembrance. 
R. M. WENLEY. 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. 
Die Kontinuitét der Atomverkettung ein Struktur- 
prinzip der lebendigen Substanz. By Dr. 
GEoRG HORMANN. Jena, Gustav Fischer. 
1899. 3M. 
That such structures as nerves, or even an 
entire animal, might be regarded as single, 
huge, chemical molecules was an hypothesis 
advanced by E. Pfluger a quarter of a century 
ago. Observation and speculation since have 
almost unanimously tended toward the preva- 
lent morphological conception-of living matter 
as an aggregate of separate units, while Pfl- 
ger’s idea has lacked support. In the present 
essay we find an interesting attempt to extend 
and to develop Pfliiger’s hypothesis by logical 
reasoning illustrated by diagrams. 
The author would have protoplasm a net work 
composed of living matter, with its meshes 
filled by the various liquids, etc., that go to 
make up the complex whole. 
This network is molecular, invisible, purely 
hypothetical. The living part of organisms is, 
