182 
‘Shakespeare’s knowledge of criminal psychology,’ 
by Frank C. Sharp. 
‘Determinism, decrees and immutable law,’ by 
Charles C. Caverno. ; 
‘Some recent observations on the migration of 
birds,’ by H. A. Winkenwerder. 
‘The plankton of Green Lake and Lake Winne- 
bago,’ by C. Dwight Marsh. 
‘The cause of cleavage in rocks,’ by C. K. Leith. 
“The supposed lessening of geyser activity in the 
Yellowstone National Park,’ by D. P. Nicholson. 
‘The orientation of stream channels as related to 
geological structure,’ by William H. Hobbs. 
“The old tungsten mine at Trumbull, Ct.,’ by 
William H. Hobbs. 
‘The future of the clay and cement industry in 
Wisconsin,’ by Ernest R. Buckley, Associate Direc- 
tor of the State Geological Survey. 
The following papers were read by title: 
“On the thermal conductivity of common woods,’ 
by L. W. Austin and C. W. Eastman. 
“The expansion of wood due to the absorption of 
water,’ by L. W. Austin, G. S. Cassels and W. H. 
Barber. 
FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP, 
Secretary. 
SCIENTIFIC BOOKS. 
Foundations of Knowledge. By ALEXANDER 
THOMAS ORMoND, McCosh Professor of Philo- 
sophy in Princeton University. New York, 
The Macmillan Co. 1900. 8yo. Pp. xxvii 
+ 528. Price, $3.00. 
Without mincing words, it may be affirmed 
at once that Ormond’s work is a very consider=- 
able performance. Not only this. Sympto- 
matic books on philosophy have been none too 
many these last twenty-five years, and the vol- 
ume before us betrays many symptoms of in- 
terest in relation to matters fundamental. Ac- 
cordingly, even if it be ‘ meant as a first rather 
than a final word on the topics with which it 
deals’ (Preface, xxv), it cannot escape the 
sharp analysis that all primary achievements 
deserve and, indeed, demand. Further, the 
“General Introduction’ betrays so excellent a 
sense of the recent historical situation, espe- 
cially in British-American thought, that the 
things Ormond has left unsaid throw no little 
light on those to which he has committed him- 
self. As the book is a first word, and largely 
SCIENCE. 
(N.S. Vou. XIII. No. 318. 
epistemological at that, in view of favors to 
come, I should like to express the hope that, 
in Ormond’s creed, things are lawful in episte- 
mology which must be suppressed sternly in 
metaphysic. 
The main body of the exposition has been di- 
vided into three ‘ Parts.’ In the first, Ormond 
deals with ‘Ground-Concepts of Knowledge.’ 
What he attempts here might be called a clear- 
ing of the air. That is to say, centuries of dis- 
cussion and of common usage have caused many 
hoary associations to cluster round certain 
terms. Every one is aware what the words, ‘ Ex- 
perience, Knowledge, Reality,’ mean; yet, 
equally, no one is aware. Otherwise, these 
counters cover so much that few stop to deploy 
their implications, and the interpretation alters 
with the ear that hears. Personal tendencies, 
customary environment of intellectual habit 
and the like, vary from man to man, from com- 
munity to community. The ‘ experience meet- 
ing’ of the pietist, the ‘experience’ demanded 
by electors to a vacant office, ‘experience’ with 
Mr. Spencer, and ‘experience’ as the latter-day 
idealist thinks of it, are by no means the same 
affair. Accordingly, with true instinct, Or- 
mond proceeds, first, to state his view of the gen- 
eral implications of ‘ Experience, Knowledge, 
Reality,’ and a very sensible, non-partisan view 
itis. ‘‘ We may define experience as the sum 
of these personal activities by means of which 
a conscious self reacts upon its object or not- 
self, and translates it into realized content, 
these activities being inclusive of thought, feel- 
ing and will; or, objectively—the system in 
which these activities are included’’ (50). ‘The 
notion of reality includes a synthesis of being and 
manifestation ’’ (64). ‘‘Themethodof knowl- 
edge, as we have conceived it, is an embodi- 
ment of the inner dialectical process by which 
the content of experience is reduced to the 
content of knowledge’’ (104). Such are the es- 
sential statements. 
The second Part reviews the ‘gradual de- 
velopment of the knowing processes,’ and is 
entitled, ‘Evolution of the Categories of 
Knowledge.’ At this point, even if one have 
not noted its presence previously, the modern 
outlook of the work becomes abundantly ap- 
parent. To be specific, the contemporary de- 
