FEBRUARY 1, 1901.] 
mand for a dynamic, as opposed to a static, 
view of experience receives satisfaction. After 
analyzing the nature of the categories, Ormond 
proceeds to thresh the old straw of Space, 
Time, Quantity, Quality, Cause and Substance, 
offering, however, certain stimulating novel- 
ties, particularly in his treatment of the two 
last ; this, even if we demur to his allegations 
that ‘The notion of agency is a persistent ele- 
ment of that of cause’ (174), and that ‘the 
' category of substance represents the mode by 
which experience realizes those points of rest 
or permanence in its world which are necessary 
in order to render the series of changes pos- 
sible’ (192). Thence he passes to the subject 
80 much agitated and so vitally interesting to- 
day—to ‘ Community or Interaction, the Dyna- 
mice Consciousness, the Austhetic Categories, 
the Subject Consciousness, Categories of the 
Subject Consciousness, the World of Individ- 
uals, the Consciousness of Community.’ The 
point at which he elects to take up the ‘ Subject 
Consciousness’ is worthy of especial remark. 
Every praise ought to be accorded this abun- 
dant recognition of the newer insights and 
problems. Similarly, one cannot fail to be 
struck favorably with the frank manner in 
which Ormond tackles this task, even although 
he proceeds from presuppositions that antedate 
the dynamic categories, do not grow out of 
them, nay, as the strong probability runs, are 
forbidden, if not exploded entirely, by them. 
To readers of SCIENCE, the third Part pre- 
sents much matter of genuine interest. Greatly 
daring, Ormond has christened it ‘The Trans- 
cendent Factor in Knowledge.’ But names 
need not frighten us, when we discover that he 
places within these dread limits that vital 
modern problem, the relation between science 
and philosophy. Moreover, in outlining this 
relation, he formulates what must be taken as 
his characteristic contribution to pending meta- 
physical inquiries—the concept of transcendency 
within experience. ‘' We have seen that science 
deals with the transcendent and that meta- 
physics has something to do with experience. 
* * * The discussion * * * has put us in a 
position to see that one of the points of differ- 
ence consists in the fact that the aim of science, 
in so far as it finds it necessary to recognize the 
SCIENCE 
183 
transcendent at all, is simply to employ the 
concept of it in determining the nature of the 
relative in experience. This accounts for the 
fact that science stops in its attempt to define 
the transcendent at that point where that proc- 
ess ceases to be necessary to the definition of 
the relative. Metaphysics, on the other hand, 
is directly concerned with the determination of 
the transcendent, not so much as a principle for 
the definition of the relative in experience, as 
for the complete determination and satisfaction 
of the relative experience as a whole through 
the grounding of it in that which is absolute 
and complete. Having for its aim then the 
grounding and completing of the relative experi- 
ence itself in that which transcends it, the 
determination of this transcendent nature be- 
comes a matter of direct interest to it, and its 
attitude toward the transcendent is from the 
outset, therefore, different from that of sci- 
ence’? (823-4). 
At this point precisely, one must take issue 
with the author. If what he says about the 
mission of metaphysics be true, then science 
may once more say to philosophy what she has 
sometimes said before: ‘All right, I’ll keep the 
inside of the house, you may doas you will with 
the outside.’ For, by definition, the transcend- 
ent happens to be the super-experiential, that 
concerning which anything may be said; and we 
cannot too often recall that anything and noth- 
ing are identical. To attempt to fill out this 
word with meaning, as Ormond seems to do 
again and again, is, of course, to negate trans- 
cendency. The fact is that Ormond (this is 
part of his great interest) represents a point of 
view which, unconsciously, mediates between 
the old pre-Kantian dualism and the desiderated 
organic monism—a theory still in the air, but, 
nevertheless, the sole defensible ground of 
scientific dualism, and also of the conservation 
of those aspects of experience which Ormond 
has in mind when he writes ‘transcendent.’ 
Had he ploughed longer with the heifer of 
science, he might have earned vouchers admit- 
ting him to this philosophical paradise ; as it is, 
he whoruns may read the flaw in the credentials 
presented here. 
Consider the following passages, for example. 
‘The real, then, is possible content of con- 
