i 
288 
conditions are somewhat different. Here 
tradition manifests itself in an action per- 
formed by the individual. The more fre- 
quently this action is repeated, the more 
firmly it will become established, and the 
less will be the conscious equivalent accom- 
panying the action; so that customary ac- 
tions which are of very frequent repetition 
become entirely unconscious. Hand in hand 
with this decrease of consciousness goes 
an increase in the emotional value of the 
omission of such activities, and still more 
of the performance of actions contrary to 
custom. A greater will power is required 
to inhibit an action which has become well 
established ; and combined with this effort 
of the will power are feelings of intense 
displeasure. 
This leads us to the third problem, which 
is closely associated with the difference be- 
tween the manifestation of the power of 
civilized man and of primitive man to in- 
hibit impulses. It is the question of choice 
as dependent upon value. It is evident 
from the preceding remarks that, on the 
whole, we value most highly what conforms 
to our previous actions’ This does not 
imply that it must be identical with our 
previous actions, but it must be on the 
line of development of our previous actions. 
This is particularly true of ethical con- 
cepts. No action can find theapproval of a 
people which is fundamentally opposed to 
its customs and traditions. Among our- 
selves it is considered proper and a matter 
of course to treat the old with respect, for 
children to look after the welfare of their 
aged parents; and not to do so would be 
considered base ingratitude. Among the 
Eskimo we find an entirely different stand- 
ard. It is required of children to kill 
their parents when they have become so 
old as to be helpless and no longer of 
any use to the family or to the community. 
It would be considered a breach of filial 
duty not to kill the aged parent. Revolting 
SCIENCE. 
[N.S. Von. XIII. No. 321. 
though this custom may seem to us, it is 
founded on an ethical law of the Eskimo, 
which rests on the whole mass of tradi- 
tional lore and custom. 
One of the best examples of this kind is 
found in the relation between individuals 
belonging to different tribes. There are a 
number of primitive hordes to whom every 
stranger not a member of the horde is an 
enemy, and where it is right to damage the 
enemy to the best of one’s power and ability, 
and if possible to kill him. This custom is 
founded largely on the idea of the solidarity 
of the horde, and of the feeling that it is the 
duty of every member of the horde to de- 
stroy all possible enemies. Therefore every 
person not a member of the horde must be 
considered as belonging to a class entirely 
distinct from the members of the horde, 
and is treated accordingly. We can trace 
the gradual broadening of the feeling of fel- 
lowship during the advance of civilization. 
The feeling of fellowship in the horde ex- 
pands to the feeling of unity of the tribe, 
to a recognition of bonds established by a 
neighborhood of habitat, and further on to 
the feeling of fellowship among members 
of nations. This seems to be the limit of 
the ethical concept of fellowship of man 
which we have reached at the present 
time. When we analyze the strong feeling 
of nationality which is so potent at the 
present time, we recognize that it consists 
largely in the idea of the preeminence of 
that community whose member we happen 
to be,—in the preeminent value of its lan- 
guage, of its customs and of its traditions, 
and in the belief that it is right to preserve 
its peculiarities and to impose them upon 
the rest of the world. The feeling of na- 
tionality as here expressed, and the feeling 
of solidarity of the horde, are of the same 
order, although modified by the gradual 
expansion of the idea of fellowship; but 
the ethical point of view which makes it 
justifiable at the present time to increase 
