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SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. III. No. 67 



2. Reflexes are quicker. Suppose instead 

 of winking reflexly when a foreign body ap- 

 proaches the eye, I waited to see whether it 

 was near enough to be dangerous, or even shut 

 my eye as quickly as I could, I should join the 

 ranks of the blind in short order. 



3. Reflex actions are more deep-seated and 

 arose genetically first. What keeps the infant 

 alive and in touch with his environment before 

 the voluntary fibers are developed ? This gen- 

 etic utility alone would seem critical enough to 

 justify most of the genuine reflexes of the organ- 

 ism — supplemented, of course, by the mother ! 



4. Intelligent actions are centrally stimulated. 

 This means that brain processes release the 

 energy which goes out in movement, and that 

 something earlier must stimulate the brain pro- 

 cesses. This something is association in some 

 shape between present stimulating agencies in 

 the environment and memories, or pleasures 

 and pains. In other words, certain central pro- 

 cesses intervene between the outside stimulus 

 and the release of the energies of movement. 

 In reflexes, however, no such central influence 

 intervenes. The stimulus in the environment 

 passes directly — is reflected — into the motor 

 apparatus. Hence the reflex is more direct, 

 undeviating, invariable, sure. For example, re- 

 search has recently proved that involuntary 

 movements may be produced in a variety of 

 normal circumstances, and in hysterical sub- 

 jects, when the stimulation is too weak, or in- 

 termittent, or unimportant, to be perceived at 

 all. 



5. Experiments show that the energies of the 

 two are not quantitatively the same. Mosso 

 and Waller have shown that the muscles 

 may work under direct stimulation after being 

 quite exhausted for voluntary action, and vice 

 versa. They may be exchanges of energy be- 

 tween the two circuits involved, which give the 

 animal increased force in this reaction or that. 



6. The intelligence could not attend to the 

 necessary functions of life without the aid of 

 reflexes, to say nothing of the luxuries of 

 acquisition. So not to get the reflexes would 

 prevent the growth of the intelligence. For 

 example, suppose we had to walk, wink, 

 breathe, swallow, scare away flies and mosqui- 

 toes, etc., all by voluntary attention to the 



details and all at the same time. While chas- 

 ing flies we should forget to breathe ! And 

 when should we have a moment's time to think ? 

 In this line it is in order to cite the experiments 

 made on ' distraction,' which show that mo.st of 

 the common adaptations of life can go on by 

 reflex and sub-conscious processes while the in- 

 telligence is otherwise occupied.* 



7. Attention and voluntary intermeddling 

 with reflex and instinctive functions tends to 

 destroy their efiiciency, bringing confusion and 

 all kinds of disturbance. 



These are all simple psychological facts, and 

 more might be added showing that instinct has 

 its own great utility even when the intelligence 

 may perform the same actions in its own fash- 

 ion. So it remains in each case to find out this 

 utility and measure it, before we say that it is 

 not of selective value. I should say that re- 

 flexes are generally of supreme importance and 

 value; and if so, then natural selection may be 

 appealed to to account for them. So, about all 

 that remains of this argument of Romanes is 

 the contribution which it makes to the refuta- 

 tion of his other one, from co-adaptations. The 

 assumption of intelligence disposes of both the 

 arguments, for the intelligence supplements 

 slight co-adaptations and so gives them selective 

 value ; but it does not keep them from getting 

 farther selective value as instincts, reflexes, 

 etc., by farther variation. 



II. But there is another very interesting 

 question also to be settled by fact. Romanes 

 and others cite simple reflexes as well as com- 

 plex instincts as giving illustrations of the ap- 

 plication of the principle of ' inherited habit ' or 

 ' lapsed intelligence ;' and the cases which Ro- 

 manes lays great stress on are the reflex actions 

 of man's withdrawal of the leg from irritation 

 to the soles, and the brainless frog's balancing 

 himself, f The Neo-Lamarckian theory requires 

 the assumption of intelligence for all of these. 

 I have shown that granting the intelligence, 

 that is just the assumption which in many cases 

 enables us to discard the Lamarckian factor. 

 But we may ask, is the assumption itself neces- 

 sary for all reflexes ? 



*See Binet, Alterations of Personality, Part II., 

 ch. 5. (Eng. trans, announced by Appletons. ) 

 t Passage cited. 



