May 15, 1896.] 



SCIENCE. 



743 



try where I met with so much kindness and 

 such uniform courtesy. 



C. Lloyd Morgan. 

 Univeesity College, Bristol, England. 



the subject op consciottsness. 

 Editor Science: Referring to the review 

 of my 'Lehrbuch der Allgemeinen Psychologie' 

 in your valuable magazine for September, 1895, 

 which has but recently come to my notice, I 

 sincerely regret that the reviewer should have 

 fallen into so manifest an error as to suppose 

 the 'subject of consciousness' of my 'Psycho- 

 logic ' to be equivalent to ' self-consciousness; ' 

 though he expresses himself with some hesi- 

 tancy when he says 'it seems most nearly,' 

 etc. As I have pointed out in my work, the 

 misunderstanding Is quite apt to arise,, from the 

 fact that the word ' subject ' is often used in the 

 sense of the ' Ego ' or ' Self,' as even shown by 

 the reviewer when he says, ' the consciousness 

 of self or subject.' But that is just the very 

 sense in which I do not use the word ' subject.' 

 With me, the ' subject of consciousness ' does 

 not designate the ' Ego ' or the ' conscious men- 

 tal individual,' but only its fundamental unify- 

 ing general abstract element, which always ex- 

 ists in the closest union with the other element, 

 which I call attribute of consciousness, and with 

 tvhich it constitutes the individual unit ' con- 

 sciousness ' or 'conscious individual.' When 

 this is distinctly understood it will be impos- 

 sible to mistake the ' subject of consciousness,' 

 i. e., the psychological foundation of all men- 

 tality, for 'self-consciousness,' which is but a 

 later development of the individual mind, the 

 ' mental individual. ' It is a source of great sat- 

 isfaction to me to have been the first to call at- 

 tention to this fundamental unifying element. 

 I call it ' subject,' though I shall gladly give up 

 the name if any one will suggest another that is 

 not so liable to be misunderstood. In my ' Psy- 

 chologie ' I lay particular stress upon the fact 

 that, if this ' subject ' were not originally present 

 in mental life as the unifying element, together 

 with the attributes of consciousness (sensations, 

 feelings, etc.); if, therefore, as the associationists 

 think, mental life were possible without a sub- 

 ject of consciousness, it would be impossible to 

 explain ' self-consciousness, ' which makes its 



appearance later; for it is precisely this self- 

 consciousness, which is based primarily upon 

 the existence of the ' subject ' as an element of 

 consciousness; hut for that very reason it is far 

 from being identical with that 'subject.' 



Johannes Rehmke. 

 , Geeifswald, April 16, 1896. 



the prerogatives of a state geologist. 



Editor Science : In connection with the 

 communication of Dr. Keyes, published in 

 Science, April 24th, page 365, permit me to say 

 to any who may have a passing interest in the 

 subject that I sent the impression paper copy of 

 the original manuscript to the Editor of Science 

 with a copy of the publication as it appeared, 

 with a request that he kept the two for some 

 months in order that any one wishing to look 

 into the matter might have an opportunity to 

 do so and judge for himself whether I wrong- 

 fully represented matters in my communication 

 published in Science of April 3d last. I might 

 also state that I sent Dr. Keyes a copy of the 

 letter nearly three months before it was pub- 

 lished, with a statement that I would publish 

 the same if he did not do something to give me 

 credit for that which was mine, but which had 

 been published under his name. 



Erasmus Haworth. 



A correction. 

 It is unfortunate that although the figure 

 from Dr. Miigge's paper which I reproduced in 

 Science last week (p. 698) was expressly marked 

 ' top ' on one side, it has been inserted upside 

 down by the compositor. In its present posi- 

 tion the figure is meaningless and even mislead- 

 ing. T. A. Jaggar, Jr. 



the absolute AND THE RELATIVE. 



To THE Editor of Science: Your corre- 

 spondent 'M.,' in the number of Science for 

 April 24th, raises a new issue with me ; one 

 which has only an indirect bearing upon the 

 subject matter of my article on the ' Illusion 

 Concerning Rest. ' In that article I attempted 

 to demonstrate that motion cannot be created 

 or destroyed by collision, but that the body in 

 motion can be only deflected thereby. Now 

 my friend abandons that demonstration and 



