744 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. ni. No. 72. 



raises another question about tlie nature of tlie 

 absolute and the relative in motion, and shows 

 that he entertains an illusion concerning rela- 

 tion. Of this illusion I shall treat hereafter in 

 another article. 



If there was but one particle in the world 

 having motion it would change place. Such a 

 particle does not exist alone, for there is a 

 multeity of particles; but one particle can be 

 considered as existing alone. The particle 

 then would change its place because it had 

 motion, and one place can be compared with 

 another ; but as in fact there are a multeity of 

 particles there is also position which is a rela- 

 tion among particles and we may therefore 

 define motion as change of position, and as 

 other particles have motion it is a mutual change 

 of position. By comparing the one particle 

 with the many the demonstration of its motion 

 is perfected. By comparing the motion of a 

 molar body with the motion of its particles and 

 also with the motion of the earth it is seen that 

 molar motion may cease, but that this cessation 

 does not end its molecular nor its stellar mo- 

 tions. That a molar body may come to rest 

 only one of its modes of motion must be de- 

 stroyed, therefore, rest is not the end of all the 

 motion of any molar body but only the stoppage 

 of molar motion. I have pointed out that the 

 creation of molar motion is the deflection of the 

 other motions inhering in the body and also 

 that the destruction of molar motion is also the 

 deflection of other motions in the body, and no 

 scientific man will deny these propositions; but 

 scientific men have believed that the creation 

 and destruction of molar motion involves not 

 only deflection, but also under some circum- 

 stances, though not under all, creates and de- 

 stroys motion as speed. This I deny and chal- 

 lenge any scientific man to demonstrate any 

 creation or destruction of motion ; and, more 

 than that, I claim that Newton's law of motion 

 and the doctrine of the persistence of energy 

 both teach that motion cannot be created or 

 destroyed. 



To define motion as change of position instead 

 of change of place is advantageous, for scientific 

 men desire to measure motion both as speed 

 and as path ; but to measure a quantity and 

 express it, it must be measured in terms of an- 



other and expressed in terms of another. Thus 

 it is that science uses the best definitions for 

 its purj)oses. I would not write for a scientific 

 journal if I did not believe that I was making 

 a contribution to science. In the case of this 

 series of articles I confidently believe that I 

 shall make a contribution to psychology. I 

 desire to explain the nature of certitudes and 

 illusions by explaining specific certitudes and 

 illusions, and finally I wish to explain the law 

 of mental evolution which is the eliminating of 

 incongruous notions and the criterion for distin- 

 guishing certitudes from illusions. Now, my 

 friend need not fear that the bottom will drop 

 out of any real science. 



The illusion concerning relation is a funda- 

 mental notion in idealism. Those who have 

 fully thought out idealism in all its conse- 

 quences, as Kant seems to have done and 

 Fichte and Hegel surely did, first attempt to 

 resolve all material phenomena into relations, 

 then affirm that the only absolute is found in 

 mind and that all actuality is mind and that 

 the material universe exists only in thought. 

 I shall attempt to show the certitudes and illu- 

 sions contained in this philosophy, and for this 

 purpose it becomes necessary for me to define, 

 illustrate and demonstrate the absolute, then 

 to define, illustrate and demonstrate the rela- 

 tive, and finally to point out the illusions con- 

 cerning the absolute and the relative which 

 have existed and which are especially charac- 

 teristic of metaphysic, but which sometimes 

 exist in science. 



That which exists in one and is essential to 

 its existence is absolute, but as there is more 

 than one, that absolute necessarily becomes 

 relative because there is more than one. In 

 the world there is no such thing as a pure 

 absolute and there is no such thing as a pure 

 relative. If there is no absolute there is no 

 world; if there is no relative there is no world. 

 This is one of the fundamental propositions 

 which I am seeking to demonstrate, and for 

 that purpose I am seeking to point out both 

 elements, that the phantasy of metaphysic may 

 be dispelled, and science may not be burdened 

 with illusions. In my article on rest I tried to 

 point out one of these illusions which inheres 

 in all metaphysical reasoning and which lingers- 



