August 31, 1906.] 



SCIENCE. 



259 



ence, they leave no place for economic the- 

 ory. Curiously enough, they imagine that 

 by confining themselves to historical gen- 

 eralizations they are following the induct- 

 ive method of Bacon. A closer study of 

 Bacon's work would have revealed to them 

 that true science does not consist in the 

 mere grouping of historical phenomena. 

 In fact, Bacon makes a distinction between 

 what he calls the popular and the inductive 

 method, or wTiat may be preferably called, 

 following the example of John Rae, the 

 systematic and the scientific. The two are 

 commonly confused, but are entirely dis- 

 tinct. 'System' consists in classifying 

 phenomena; 'science' consists in discover- 

 ing the laws to which they conform. Sys- 

 tem explains phenomena by means of what 

 is common and familiar; science explains 

 them by what is simple, however recondite. 

 System is exemplified in such descriptive 

 studies as grammar, descriptive geography 

 and history ; science is exemplified by such 

 analytical studies as mathematics, physics, 

 and latterly, biology. The classifier or 

 system-maker is content with generaliza- 

 tion of facts. These express the us^^al 

 order of events, for instance, that the sun 

 rises once a day. They do not express the 

 reason or principle. The difference be- 

 tween system and science is the difference 

 between a general fact and a necessary 

 truth, between rules and laws. Exceptions 

 to rules do not destroy them as rules; in 

 fact, we say 'the exception proves the rule.' 

 This, however, is not true of laws. A 

 'law' which has an exception is no law at 

 all. 



Many studies which are now scientific 

 had their origin in what was originally 

 systematic. The predecessors of the mod- 

 ern physicists classified bodies into 'light' 

 and 'heavy.' Iron, they maintained, is 

 heavy and therefore falls ; fire is not heavy, 

 and therefore rises. How different is this 

 obsolete method of treating the subject 



from our modem analytic notion of grav- 

 ity, or rate of increase of velocity, by means 

 of which are explained both the falling of 

 iron and the rising of 'fire.' 



Similarly, the prototype of biology was 

 'natural history,' and consisted chiefly in 

 the mere classification of animals and 

 plants into species, genera, etc. Modern 

 biology has supplanted such elaborate 

 classification by introducing, through Dar- 

 win, 'the analytical ideas of heredity, varia- 

 tion and selection, and in this way the de- 

 scriptive study of natural history has been 

 converted into the true science of biology. 



The same evolution which has been out- 

 lined in physical and biological science is 

 doubtless taking place in economic science. 

 Yet it must be confessed that few have yet 

 mastered the distinction between a general 

 fact and a scientific law. When we hear 

 it stated as fundamental in political econ- 

 omy that skilled labor is better paid than 

 unskilled, it is clear that this is merely 

 a general rule and not a necessary law. 

 The single fact that certain seamstresses, 

 though skilled, are illpaid, is sufficient to 

 disprove the statement as a necessary law, 

 though it does not affect it as a general 

 fact. 



The historical school justly complains of 

 the superficial character of the theories 

 w^hich have been sometimes offered. This 

 objection holds, however, not against the- 

 ory as such, but against false theories ; and 

 herein lies the virtue of Bacon's method. 

 The inductive method, by which any the- 

 ory of phenomena must be checked by 

 reference to actual historical fact, thus 

 forms the means of distinguishing between 

 truth and falsity. Rejecting false theories 

 is quite different from rejecting all the- 

 ories. What is needed now in political 

 economy is to rid ourselves of the false 

 and superficial theories, on the one hand, 

 which have been constructed a priori and 

 irrespective of facts; and, on the other 



