304 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XV. No. 373. 



or two. Some of the older American philo- 

 sophical text-books were in the habit of de- 

 fining or at least trying to define concepts like 

 consciousness, mind, feeling, etc., and many 

 persons who have used these books still re- 

 member the thought-destroying effect produced 

 by their study. Perhaps these experiences 

 have made us too sceptical with regard to 

 certain definitions, but it does not seem that 

 we are helped very much by statements like 

 the following: "Activity (mental). If and 

 in so far as the intrinsic nature of conscious 

 process involves tendency towards a Terminus 

 (q. v.), it is active process, and is said to have 

 activity." "Admiration. Feeling as going 

 out in active approval." "Attention. The 

 mind at work or beginning to work upon its 

 object." "Being. The most general predicate 

 possible and to be affirmed of anjrthing what- 

 ever." "Consciousness. The distinctive char- 

 acter of whatever may be called mental life. 

 It is the point of division between mind and 

 not mind." "Determination. The cooperation 

 of all the factors which adequately condition 

 and issue in a mental End-state (q. v.)." 

 "Feeling. Consciousness as experiencing 

 modifications abstracted from (1) the deter- 

 mination of objects, and (2) the determination 

 of action." Perhaps the best thing we can do 

 in many cases is to confess our inability to 

 give satisfactory defitnitions, as the German 

 professor did, who, when told by one of his 

 students in an examination that he did not 

 know what an animal was, frankly declared 

 that neither did he. So far as the terminology 

 is concerned it is to be hoped that the Dic- 

 tionary will bring about some uniformity of 

 usage. Its recommendations are, as a rule, 

 very sensible, and there is no reason why they 

 should not be adopted. 



With respect to the value of the different 

 articles there will, of course, be difference of 

 opinion. Most of them, however, serve their 

 purpose well. Among those pertaining to phi- 

 losophy and closely allied subjects the follow- 

 ing do not seem to receive the treatment which 

 their importance demands : Analogies of Ex- 

 perience ; Association of Ideas ; Conscience ; 

 Cause Theory (perhaps the article on Parallel- 

 ism will supply the deficiency) ; Deism ; Dia- 



lectic; Dogmatism (Kant's meaning of the 

 term is not clearly brought out) ; Education ; 

 Empirio-eriticism ; Free Will (and determin- 

 ism) ; Innate Ideas (Leibniz's view should be 

 mentioned here) ; Instruction. The following 

 are among the most helpful and suggestive : 

 Cause; Cause and Effect; Change; Epistemol- 

 ogy; Experience; Greek Terminology; Hegel's 

 Terminology; Kant's Terminology (unfortu- 

 nately this does not include Kant's ethical and 

 aesthetic terminology) ; Judgment ; Latin and 

 Scholastic Terminology. The articles on psy- 

 chology and Eesthetics are generally very good. 



The number of subjects discussed in the first 

 volume is quite large, and the Dictionary 

 seems to be very complete in this respect. It 

 would, of course, be impossible to give each 

 possible topic a separate place in the book; 

 many things will have to be considered togeth- 

 er under general heads, and the index to the 

 entire work, which is to appear at the end of 

 the second volume, will most likely help the 

 student in his search for certain terms. Per- 

 haps some of the following subjects, which I 

 have tried to find, may turn up in this way: 

 Animal Spirits ; Astrology ; Corpuscular 

 Theory ; Duty (and inclination) ; Dynamism ; 

 Dysteleology (a term coined by Hseckel) ; 

 Eduction (a term used by some English lo- 

 gicians) ; Egoism (in the sense of solipsism) ; 

 Energetik (the term used by Ostwald) ; Ethel- 

 ism; Ethical Culture Movement; Euhemer- 

 ism; Evaluation; Idiopathic (as contrasted 

 with sympathetic, a 'term frequently used by 

 the Germans — e. g., by Paulsen) ; Plusionism ; 

 Individualism (ethical. Reference might here 

 be made to the article on Anarchism) ; Intel- 

 ligible and Empirical Character. There are 

 two articles which might easily be brought un- 

 der the same head : .^Etiology and Etiology. 

 In the article on Determinism we are referred 

 to an article on Free Will Controversies. 

 There is no such article. There ought to be a 

 reference under Empirio-critieism to the ar- 

 ticle on Introjection, which gives one a much 

 better idea of Avenarius's system than the 

 first article. 



The biographical part of the work is, in my 

 opinion, capable of great improvement. Many 

 important names are left out, many unimpor- 



