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SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XV. No. 383 



who studies society objectively can avoid rep- 

 resenting tlie facts, provisionally at least, in 

 forms whicli vary from his only in detail. 

 Each new examination of the facts leads up 

 to or builds upon an analysis substantially 

 equivalent to his. Professor Giddings' con- 

 ception of the things involved in general soci- 

 ology is simply a variation of the 'General 

 Theory of Forms and Functions (Social Mor- 

 phology, Social Physiology, and Social Psy- 

 chology),' contained in 'Bau und Leben,' Part 

 I. The biological figures which Schaeffle uses 

 so liberally are a mere accident. The rela- 

 tions which he formulates are the same reac- 

 tions of persons upon persons which all sociol- 

 ogists must sooner or later take accoimt of in 

 substantially the same manner. Professor 

 Giddings' hint (Preface, p. x), that while the 

 present volimie deals with 'only one-half of 

 the field of general sociology' the other half, 

 as he views it, consists of social genesis, cor- 

 responds with Schaeffle's second division, 'The 

 General Theory of Evolution.' The teleolog- 

 ical thread running through Professor Gid- 

 dings' Part IV. is quite in the spirit of the 

 telic theory that pervades Schaefile's treat- 

 ment. These facts are worth noting, as a 

 commentary on the prevailing impression that 

 sociology is merely a group-name for a litter 

 of unrelated opinions. The sociologists have 

 given occasion for this idea by magnifying the 

 minutiae of their differences. All the while 

 a consensus has been forming, which will pres- 

 ently justify itself as the framework within 

 which our whole conception of life must be 

 arranged. Distinct as are the individual ele- 

 ments in Professor Giddings' work, it should 

 be said that they are incidents in the develop- 

 ment of a common body of sociological doc- 

 trine, and that their value is in proportion to 

 their compatibility vnth that containing 

 whole. 



Of the four parts of Book II., the first trav- 

 erses well-worn ground of anthropology and 

 ethnology, though not in the beaten tracks. 

 The chapters are entitled: I., 'Situation'; II., 

 'Aggregation'; III., 'Demotic Composition'; 

 IV., 'Demotic Unity.' In each of these chap- 

 ters the author has made important sugges- 

 tions as to the technique of the subject. For 



reasons that will appear later, however, we 

 may neglect details at this point, and speak 

 more particularly of Part II. Though this 

 portion occupies but 125 of the 302 pages in 

 the whole work, it contains the most original 

 features of the argument. The arrangement 

 is as follows: I., 'Like Response to Stimulus'; 

 II., 'Mental and Practical Resemblance'; III., 

 'The Consciousness of Kind'; IV., 'Concerted 

 Volition.' While, for reasons to be stated in 

 a moment, I do not believe that these chapters 

 are properly sociology at all, and while I do 

 not believe that they indicate the most advan- 

 tageous passage out of psychology into sociol- 

 ogy, they are brilliant and inspiring in almost 

 every line. The psychologist, however, rather 

 than the sociologist, is the competent judge of 

 their contents. These reservations do not 

 apply to the chapter on concerted volition. Its 

 value, both as a stimulus of sociological re- 

 search and as an indication of sociological and 

 social demands upon psychology, would justify 

 very emphatic praise. 



Instead of entering upon microscopic exam- 

 ination, it seems better worth while to offer 

 two cardinal criticisms of the book. It should 

 be said in advance that, from the sociologists' 

 point of view, the propositions to be urged 

 against Professor Giddings charge sins of 

 omission, not of commission. They recognize 

 the positive service which his work has ren- 

 dered, but they aim to fix its relation to the 

 development of sociology in general. The first 

 proposition accordingly attempts to place Pro- 

 fessor Giddings' work more definitely than its 

 author does, in correlation with other work. 

 The second points out one of its limitations. 



First then, as was hinted above, the work is 

 primarily and predominantly not sociology, 

 biit ego-ology. Its vanishing point is not so- 

 ciety, but the individual. As we have seen. 

 Part I. of the argument proper (Book II.)' is 

 anthropology and ethnology. Three quarters 

 of Part II. must be classed as psychology 

 without benefit of society. To the layman 

 this may appear a petty matter. What differ- 

 ence does it make whether the work bears the 

 label of one shop or another, so long as it is 

 good work? It really makes a great deal of 

 difference. There either is or is not a need 



