July 4, 1902.] 



SCIENCE. 



be, behind the physical explanation, com- 

 plete agnosticism is of course the only pos- 

 sible attitude. Such in barest— but I be- 

 lieve correct— outline is the history of 

 modern monism— the doctrine that there is 

 but one kind of power in the universe. 



It is evident that monism involves the 

 elimination of two concepts, God and con- 

 sciousness. It is true that monists some- 

 times use these words, but it is mere jug- 

 glery, for they deny the concept for which 

 the words actually stand. Now conscious- 

 ness is too familiar to all men to be sum- 

 marily cast aside and dismissed. Some 

 way must be found to account for it. 

 From the monistic standpoint there is a 

 choice between two possible alternatives; 

 either consciousness is a form of energy, 

 like heat, etc., or it is merely a so-called 

 epiphenomenon. As there is no evidence 

 that consciousness is a form of energy, 

 only the second alternative is in reality 

 available, and in fact has been adopted 

 by the monists. 



It is essential to have a clear notion of 

 what is meant by an epiphenomenon. 

 Etymologically the word indicates some- 

 thing which is superimposed upon the ac- 

 tual phenomenon. It designates an ac- 

 companying incident of a process which is 

 assumed to have no causal relation to the 

 further development of the process. In 

 practice it is used chiefly in regard to the 

 relation of the mind or consciousness to 

 the body, and is commonly employed by 

 those philosophers who believe that con- 

 sciousness has no causal relation to any 

 subsequent physiological process. 



For many years I have tried to recognize 

 some actual idea underneath the epiphe- 

 nomenon hypothesis of consciousness, but 

 it more and more seems clear to me that 

 there is no idea at all, and that the hypoth- 

 esis is an empty phrase, a subterfuge, 

 which really amoi^nts only to this — we can 

 explain consciousness very easily by merely 



assuming that it does not require to be 

 explained at all. Is not that really the 

 confession made by the famous assertion 

 that the consciousness of the brain no 

 more requires explanation than the aquos- 

 ity of water ? 



Monism is not a strong system of phi- 

 losophy, for it is not so much the product 

 of deep and original thinking as the result 

 of a contemporary tendency. It is not the 

 inevitable end of a logical process, because 

 it omits consciousness, but rather an in- 

 cidental result of an intellectual impulse. 

 Its very popularity betokens its lack of 

 profundity, and its delight in simple for- 

 mula is characteristic of that mediocrity 

 of thought which has much more ambi- 

 tion than real poAver and accepts simplic- 

 ity of formularizationl as eqiiivalent to 

 evidence. It would seem stronger too, if 

 it were less defended as a faith. Strong 

 partizans make feeble philosophers. 



Consciousness ought to be regarded as 

 a biological phenomenon, which the biolo- 

 gist has to investigate in order to increase 

 the number of verifiable data concerning 

 it. In that way, rather than by specula- 

 tive thought, is the problem of conscious- 

 ness to be solved, and it is precisely be- 

 cause biologists are beginning to stvidy 

 consciousness that it is becoming, as I 

 said in opening, the newest problem of 

 science. 



The biologist must necessarily become 

 more and more the supreme arbiter of all 

 science and philosophy, for human knowl- 

 edge is itself a biological function which 

 will become comprehensible just in the 

 measure that biology progresses and brings 

 knowledge of man, both by himself and 

 through comparison with all other living 

 things. We must look to biologists for the 

 mighty generalizations to come rather 

 than to the philosophers, becavise great new 

 thoughts are generated more by the ac- 

 cumulation of observations than by deep 



