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SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XVI. No. 401. 



ecus inferences, prejudicial to a correct under- 

 standing of what is really taking place and to 

 the setting up of wrong standards in respect 

 to the degree of difference legitimately open to 

 recognition by name. J. A. Allen. 



PRESIDENT MINOT ON 'tHE PROBLEM OF CON- 

 SCIOUSNESS IN ITS BIOLOGICAL. ASPECTS.'* 



Sciences, like human beings, are seldom in- 

 difierent to the good opinion of others. Even 

 age and great respectability never wholly dull 

 the moral consciousness of a science to the 

 approval and disapproval of its neighbors. 

 This sensitiveness is, however, keenest and 

 most easily wrought upon in the younger sci- 

 ences, for the reason that these are most fre- 

 quently challenged to defend their right to 

 exist. Self-consciousness — provided it does 

 not approach morbid embarrassment — is by 

 no means a misfortune to the youtliful sci- 

 ence. It clears up its concepts, gives self-con- 

 fidence and helps it to get on with its fellows. 

 Psychology has had, more than most sciences, 

 to give a strict account of itself and of its 

 methods, both because it has had an unusual 

 amount of prejudice to overcome and because 

 it has developed in an unusually critical and 

 criticising period of thought. The social 

 pressure has, however, served its purpose, so 

 far as psychology is concerned ; for psychology 

 — even as an experimental science — has passed 

 its majority and knows perfectly well what its 

 task IS and how it means to perform it. But, 

 while this is true, and while one science is 

 never, within its own borders, responsible to 

 any other coordinated branch of knowledge, 

 there is, as I have intimated, the temptation 

 to stop and listen when one's character and 

 obligations are discussed in a convocation of 

 the sciences. The temptation is not to be 

 "withstood when the discussion turns out to be 

 the authoritative opinion of a near neighbor 

 with whom important and amicable relations 

 have, for some time, been sustained. Professor 

 Minot, in his recent address at Pittsburgh, in- 

 dicates what he conceives to be the most nat- 

 ural and the most profitable attitude of the 

 biological sciences toward psychology. His 

 outline involves a definition of mental phe- 



* Science, July 4, 1902. 



nomena, a statement of the part that con- 

 sciousness plays in bionomics, and an appeal 

 to psychology to employ the comparative 

 method. The argument of the address runs 

 as follows : 



Consciousness may be regarded either as a 

 real phenomenon in the world or as an epiphe- 

 nomenon. The 'epiphenomenon hypothesis of 

 consciousness' is, according to the author, 'an 

 empty phrase, a subterfuge.' "Consciousness 

 ought to be regarded as a biological pheno- 

 menon, which the biologist has to investigate 

 in order to increase the number of verifiable 

 data concerning it. In that way, rather than 

 by speculative thought, is the problem of con- 

 sciousness to be solved, and it is precisely be- 

 cause biologists are beginning to study con- 

 sciousness that it is becoming, as I said in 

 opening, the newest problem of science." * * * 

 "For the present, it is more important to seek 

 additional positive knowledge than to hunt for 

 ultimate interpretations." The 'yotinger sci- 

 ence of experimental psychology' is, therefore, 

 to be welcomed. "It completes the circle of 

 the biological sciences." The most striking 

 peculiarity of consciousness — a peculiarity 

 which is common to biological processes — is 

 that it is teleological. "We do not know what 

 it is, we do not know how it functions, but we 

 do know why it exists," The essential 'func- 

 tion of consciousness is to dislocate in time 

 the reactions from sensations.' The evolution 

 of consciousness is a strong indication of its 

 usefulness to the organism. If it had not been 

 useful it would have disappeared. It is use- 

 ful because it permits the individual to react 

 on his accumulated experiences. Sensations 

 recur in memory and increase the scope of pos- 

 sible adjustments. Sensations are only sym- 

 bols of 'objective phenomena.' We 'see' col- 

 ors, but light — the 'external reality' — is undu- 

 lations. "Objectively, red, yellow and green 

 do not exist." These symbols are, neverthe- 

 less, convenient labels, for by means of them 

 the individual reacts appropriately on every 

 occasion. They are ' bionomically sufficient 

 because they are constant.' 'They enable con- 

 sciousness to prophesy or foresee the results 

 of the reactions of the organism,' and, hence, 

 to maintain adjustment. Animal conscious- 



