September 5, 1902.] 



SCIENCE. 



387 



ness is a homologue of human consciousness. 

 Its function is the same. Consciousness must 

 be posited at least as far down as sense organs 

 and nervous systems are to be found. These 

 considerations lead to the conclusion that 'the 

 development and improvement of conscious- 

 ness has been the most important, really the 

 dominant, factor in the evolution of the ani- 

 mal series.' Sensory and motor organs have 

 multiplied for the sake of consciousness; to 

 supply it 'with more possibilities of adjust- 

 ment to external reality.' Since mind is teleo- 

 logical, it must be primary, and reflexes and 

 instincts derivative. Through habit, con- 

 sciousness sometimes lapses — for the sake of 

 rapidity in reacting — and reflexes and in- 

 stincts take its place. If mind has been the 

 most important factor in the evolution of the 

 animal series, 'the necessity of treating con- 

 sciousness as primarily a problem for biolog- 

 ical research to solve' is obvious. The 'psy- 

 chologists ought now to apply the comparative 

 method on a grand scale.' Psychology is 

 extremely backward; but with the new method 

 we may come 'to the understanding of even 

 consciousness itself.' Consciousness is not a 

 form of energy; it is as ultimate as force, or 

 energy; but it 'has the power to change the 

 form of energy.' 



There is little doubt that Professor Minot's 

 plea for a closer alliance between biology and 

 psychology will be seconded, heartily, by many 

 biologists. The advantage promised to the 

 sciences of life is certainly alluring. It is 

 true that the alliance proposed would affect 

 a comparatively small part of the field of biol- 

 ogy — that part of zoology which deals with 

 the descent of the higher animal forms — and, 

 likewise, a comparatively small part of the 

 field of psychology. Even if we grant that 

 consciousness has as wide a range as the au- 

 thor maintains (many investigators in both 

 sciences would make the limits much narrow- 

 er), there is only a portion of one problem in 

 one of the great subdivisions of biology that 

 can hope for direct aid from psychology. Nev- 

 ertheless, no one can deny either _ that the 

 problem has enormous proportions or that 

 the promised aid is worth acquiring. As for 

 the other science involved, psychology frankly 



recognizes the importance of studying mental 

 development. But she can scarcely consider 

 incidental aid to be rendered another science 

 a sufficient excuse for abandoning her work in 

 general in order to solve a single problem. 



But, again, let us see whether the biologist's 

 demand for consciousness is as urgent as it 

 appears to be. Even though he admit mind as 

 a factor in evolution, he is not thereby re- 

 lieved from considering the development of 

 the nervous system as a likewise important 

 •factor. He will hardly deny that a complex 

 and highly differentiated nervous mechanism 

 is an advantage to the organism. If he deny 

 this, what becomes of his argument for the 

 usefulness of surviving organs? If man 

 stands high in the phylogenetic series because 

 he has a good mind, he also — by the same argu- 

 ment — stands high because he has a good 

 brain; a brain that affords him more compli- 

 cated and appropriate reactions than other 

 animals can compass. And why not go a step 

 further? Since there is no question, either in 

 psychology or in biology, that new mental 

 functions imply new nervous apparatus, or at 

 least new nervous functions, why should the 

 biologist duplicate his factors and posit a 

 double cause for a single effect? If mind 

 'dislocates' sensations in order to unite the 

 past and the present, the brain — much more 

 literally — preserves a dispositon to functionate 

 as it has already functionated, and thereby 

 . brings profit to the organism. If consciousness 

 ' lapses ' and is replaced by reflexes, in order 

 to insure more rapid adjustment, neural func- 

 tions cut corners, follow lines of least resist- 

 ance and become simplified to the same good 

 end. If one sensation 'inhibits' another — a 

 dubious doctrine ! — activity in one part of the 

 cerebrum undeniably checks activity in an- 

 other part of the cerebrum. It is natural that 

 the biologist should make excursions into psy- 

 chology when he stands in temporary need of 

 links which are missing to his phylogenetic 

 chain of causes ; but if he wishes to make 

 consciousness 'the dominant factor in the evo- 

 lution of the animal series,' he should first 

 show that consciousness contributes something 

 to descent that is not contributed by the phys- 

 ical processes underlying consciousness. When 



