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SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XVI. No. 401. 



he has done this and has settled accounts with 

 energetics — for introducing an element which 

 is not energy, but which changes the form of 

 energy — he will be ready to launch his theory 

 of psychophysical causation. He may, even, 

 found a science of psycho-bionomics, which 

 shall stand in precisely the same relation to 

 psychology and biology that psychophysics 

 now stands to psychology and physics. 



This last point raises, very naturally, the 

 question of the scope of the biological sci- 

 ences, a question 'that has been so often dis- 

 cussed that one is inclined to apologize for 

 raising it. However, Professor Minot's two- 

 fold assumption that 'scientific psychology' is 

 one of the 'great divisions of biology' and that 

 'the biologist must necessarily become more 

 and more the supreme arbiter of all science 

 and philosophy,' is sufficient excuse. The fijst 

 part of the assumption is largely a matter of 

 definition and need not distress the psycholo- 

 gist who shrinks from being lost in a vast 

 science of life. If biology can be made to 

 cover all systematic knowledge of the whole — 

 the psychophysical — organism, then it in- 

 cludes psychology ; but if it continues to cover 

 the structures, the functions and the histories 

 of organic bodies, then, just as surely, psy- 

 chology lies outside biology. The choice rests 

 on the likeness or difference of subject matter 

 and the likeness or difference of method. The 

 subject matter of psychology is, as Professor 

 Minot admits, unique. Consciousness is as 

 ultimate as force. As for method, no psychol- 

 ogist with reliable instincts ever does confuse 

 his method with the method of the embryolo- 

 gist or the physiologist, any more than he con- 

 fuses it with the method of the physicist. He 

 may and does (when it suits his purpose) use 

 — as the author advises — the 'comparative' 

 method, which is 'method' in a narrower 

 sense. So do the historian and the geologist; 

 but they are not, for that reason, accused of 

 writing biologies. 



The contention that the biologist must be- 

 come the 'supreme arbiter' because 'human 

 knowledge is itself a biological function' is a 

 challenge to the epistemologist rather than to 

 the psychologist. The epistemologist will not, 

 I imagine, find it difficult to prick the vulner- 



able point in the argument. He may, perhaps, 

 reduce the claim to an absurdity by insisting 

 that it makes biology the universal science as 

 well as the only true philosophy, or he may 

 show that the contention is itself a petitio, 

 because it assumes but cannot, so far as it is — 

 as a bit of knowledge — a mere function, stand 

 warrant for its own validity. It is good Ba- 

 conian doctrine to advise, ' observe more and 

 more and in the end you will know. A gen- 

 eralization is a mountain of observations, from 

 the summit the outlook is broad.' But one 

 does not quite see why it is the biologist — of 

 all the normally functioning organisms in the 

 world! — who is capable of generalization; 

 why ' we must look to biologists for the mighty 

 generalizations to come.' Does, then, the biol- 

 ogist monopolize the function of knowing as 

 well as the study of that function? Or is 

 this only a specific application of the advice, 

 'know then thyself? The argument is not 

 quite clear on this point. And, as for the ob- 

 servations, a mountain can neither see itself 

 nor its surroundings. If observations could 

 give their own systematic setting, we should 

 be more inclined to hold them to account when 

 they form a mere heap of dry facts set in a 

 waste of words. As the author says much 

 more truly in another connection, ' our men- 

 tal wealth * * * consists of the thought into 

 which the data of observation are transmitted 

 [transmuted ?] ' rather than in the observa- 

 tions themselves. We may take it for granted 

 that Tyndall's 'Tories' in science, who look 

 upon 'facts' as alone having value and who 

 'regard imagination as a faculty to be feared 

 and avoided rather than employed,' are an ex- 

 tinct class and that even 'deep meditation' is 

 indispensable alike to science and philosophy. 

 On the other hand, the command to 'observe 

 more and more' will scarcely find a heretic to 

 resist it . in these days of loyalty to science. 

 I cannot speak for biologists, but I am sure 

 that I can speak for psychologists — the class 

 to whom Professor Minot especially directs his 

 exhortation. Thirty years ago, psychologists 

 left off searching for the ultimate nature of 

 mind and began to clamor for actual knowl- 

 edge about mental experience. Long since, the 

 tendency to ' observe ' has become instinctive. 



