Ff.bruary 27, 1891.] 



SCIENCE. 



115 



with a smile. This is all poetic fancy. When the child 

 does begin to show partiality for mother or nurse, it is be- 

 cause the kind treatment it has already experienced in con- 

 nection with the face has already brought out the same 

 smile before ; the mother's face, that is, grows to suggest the 

 smile. At first it is not the face alone, but the personality, 

 the presence, to which the child responds; and of more 

 special suggestion, the voice is first effectual, then touch (as 

 in sleep above), and then sight. Such suggestions are 

 among the most important of infancy, serving as important 

 elements in the growth of the consciousness of self and of 

 external reality; but such considerations are not pertinent 

 to the present connection. Without delaying longer on this 

 class of suggestions, the question occurs, are we not here 

 simply observing cases of the association of ideas ? I think 

 we are warranted in answering, " No! " most emphatically, 

 for the reason that it is not an associated idea that is brought 

 up. It is a muscular movement that is produced, without 

 the production of an idea of that movement. Can we say 

 that tlie sleep suggestions first bring up an idea or image of 

 the sleep condition, or that the bottle brings up an idea of 

 the movements of grasping, or even of the sweet taste ? No, 

 the case is more direct. The energy of stimulation passes 

 over into the motor re-action through the medium of the 



FIG. 3.— SENSOBY-MOTOR SUGGESTION. 



conscious state. Further, as will appear clearer below, it 

 is not an association plus a suggestion, or aa association 

 plus an association, as current doctrines of motor-stimu- 

 lation would lead us to expect. We cannot say that 

 pleasure or pain always intervenes between the present state 

 of consciousness and the motor re-action; i.e., mother's face, 

 pleasure recalled, expression of pleasure, or present bottle, 

 sweet taste, movements to reach. I believe all this is quite 

 artificial and unnatural, — a point to which the remainder 

 of this paper will put in clear relief. 



The explanation is as before for physiological suggestion, 

 except that the re-action begins with a conscious process (O) 

 at sg (Fig. 3), and the child is getting associations between 

 sg and mc. 



3. Deliberative Suggestion. — By "deliberative sugges- 

 tion " I mean a state of mind in which such co-ordinate 

 stimuli meet, affront, oppose, further, one another. Yet I 

 do not mean "deliberation" in the full-blown volitional 

 SPDse; but suggestion that appears deliberative, while still 

 inside the re-active consciousness. It lacks self-conscious- 

 ness, self-decision, self in any form. The last three months 

 of the child's (H.'s) first year are, I think, clearly given over 

 to this kind of consciousness. Motor stimulations have 

 multiplied, the emotional life is budding forth in a variety of 

 l)rcmising. traits, the material of conscious character is pres- 

 ent; but the "ribs" of mental structure may still be seen 



through, re-active couples, response answering to appeal in a 

 complex but yet mechanical way. 



As an illustration of what I mean, I may record the fol- 

 lowing case of deliberative suggestion from H.'s thirteenth 

 month : it was more instructive to me than whole books 

 would be on the theory of the conflict of impulses. When 

 about eight months old, H. formed a peculiar habit of sud- 

 denly scratching the face of her nurse or mother with her 

 nails. It became fixed in her memory, probably because of 

 the unusual facial expression of pain, reproof, etc., which 

 followed it, until the close proximity of any one's face was 

 a strong suggestion to her to give it a violent scratch. In 

 order to break up this habit, I began to punish her by taking 

 the hand with which she scratched at once, and snapping 

 her fingers with my own first-finger hard enough to be pain- 

 ful. For about four weeks this seemed to have no effect, 

 probably because I only saw her a small portion of the 

 time, and only then did she suffer the punishment. But I 

 then observed, and those who were with her most reported, 

 that she only scratched once at a time, and grew very solemn 

 and quiet for some moments afterwards, as if thinking 

 deeply. And soon after, this climax was reached: she would 

 scratch once impulsively, be punished, and weep profusely, 

 then become as grave as a deacon, looking me in the face. I 

 would then deliberately put my cheek very close to her, and 

 she would sit gazing at it in " deep thought " for two or even 

 three minutes, hardly moving a muscle the whole time, 

 and then either suddenly scratch and be punished again, or 

 turn to something (noise or object, watch-chain, etc.) near 

 by. Having scratched, she began to cry in anticipation of 

 the punishment. Gradually the scratching became more 

 rare. She seldom yielded to the temptation after being 

 punished, and so the habit entirely disappeared. I may add 

 that her mother and myself endeavored to induce a different 

 re-action by taking the child's other hand and gently strok- 

 ing the face which she had scratched. This movement in 

 time replaced the other completely, and now the soft strok- 

 ing has become one of her most spontaneous expressions of 

 affection. 



Now, the interpretation is this, in terms of the foregoing 

 pages: the first act of scratching was probably accidental, 

 one of the spontaneous re-actions or physiological suggestions 

 so common with an infant's hands ; it passed, by reason of 

 its peculiar associations, into a sensori-motor re-action when- 

 ever the presence of a face acted as suggestion, — so far, a 

 strong direct stimulus to the motor centres. Then came the 

 pain, — a stimulus, both direct and associative, to the inhibition 

 of the foregoing. For a time the former was too strong; 

 then there followed an apparent balance between the two ; 

 and finally the pain overcame the suggestion, and the re- 

 action was permanently inhibited. The stroking re-action 

 gained all the strength of violent and intense association 

 with the elements of this mental conflict, and was thus soon 

 fixed and permanent. 



Taking this as a typical case of " deliberative suggestion," 

 — and I could instance many others, less clear, from H.'s 

 life-history, — my point is twofold: there is nothing here that 

 requires will, meaning by "will" a new influence due to 

 active consciousness (if we do call it will, we simply apply 

 a different term to phenomena which in their simplicity we 

 call by other names) ; and, second, suggestion is as original 



