October 11, 1907] 



SCIENCE 



465 



"toughs" and "tender-feet," of " Cripple- 

 Creekers " and " Bostonians " in philosophy 

 (p. 13 f.)- The picturesque phrase springs to 

 my lips again, set agog by the refreshing spec- 

 tacle of a " big pot," as the English say, 

 courageous and independent enough to avow 

 himself an anarchist in things speculative (p. 

 28 f.). For Professor James bethumps the 

 high priests, sacred and profane, of contem- 

 porary philosophy, with a kind of holy joy. 

 And, so far as my limited observation goes, 

 this joy is a pronounced and sprightly char- 

 acteristic of " the oddly-named thing pragma- 

 tism " (p. 33). In a word, pragmatism has 

 been misunderstood (p. 197), even made a 

 mockery and jest (p. 233), as Mr. James 

 alleges, because, to this point, it excels in the 

 negative nuance. 



Accordingly, I for one welcome this authori- 

 tative addition to the pragmatic canon if, per- 

 adventure, it may serve to unravel certain ex- 

 cusable puzzledoms. So, to begin with. What 

 is pragmatism? Professor James directs the 

 second of his lectures to this set question, 

 with the following results : 



Th'e pragmatic method is primarily a method 

 of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise 

 might be interminable. . . . The pragmatic method 

 in such cases is to try to interpret each notion 

 by tracing its respective practical consequences 

 (p. 45). Theories thus become instruments, not 

 answers to enigmas, in which we can rest (p. 53 ) . 

 The attitude of looking away from first things, 

 principles, " categories," supposed necessities ; and 

 of looking towards last things, fruits, conse- 

 quences, facts (p. 54). Ideas (which themselves 

 are but parts of our experience) become true just 

 in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory 

 relation with other parts of our experience (p. 

 58 ) . Truth is one species of good, and not, as is 

 usually supposed, a category distinct from good, 

 and coordinate with it. The true is the name of 

 whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 

 belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable rea- 

 sons (pp. 75-6). 



Later, our anarchist, wishing doubtless to 

 conserve his reputation, co mm its himself thus : 



Pragmatism, pending the final empirical ascer- 

 tainment of just what the balance of union and 

 disunion among things may be, must obviously 

 range herself upon the pluralistic side (p. 161). 



Common sense is letter for one sphere of life, 

 science for another, philosophical criticism for a 

 tliird; but whether either be truer absolutely. 

 Heaven only knows (p. 190). The truth of an 

 idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. 

 Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is 

 made true by events. Its verity is in fact an 

 event, a process (p. 201). "The true," to put 

 it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way 

 of our thinking, just as " the right " is only the 

 expedient in the way of our behaving (p. 222). 

 Although, more than likely, I can not see 

 these fluid matters from the pragmatic angle, 

 " the pragmatic movement, so-called," which 

 " seems to have rather suddenly precipitated 

 itself out of the air " (p. vii), appears, more 

 JacoiOj to embody a perfectly definite tend- 

 ency. The " Anglo-Hegelian school " (p. 17) 

 which has dominated the British universities 

 for a generation, and energized mightily in 

 certain American institutions, begins to pay 

 the penalty of success and sacrosanetity. The 

 bedewed gospel of the first generation has been 

 overlaid by crystallizing commentary in the 

 second. Hence, unmoved by the earlier en- 

 thusiasms and unaffected by their ramified 

 causes, contemporary critics can stand forth 

 unabashed and say of the " personal faith that 

 warms the heart of the hearer " (p. 279) : " It 

 is far too intellectualistic " (p. 70) ; for it 

 " truth means essentially an inert static rela- 

 tion " (p. 200) ; it rests " in principles after 

 this stagnant intellectual fashion " (p. 95) ; 

 " the theory of the Absolute, in particular, has 

 had to be an article of faith, affirmed dog- 

 matically and exclusively " (p. 159) ; " for 

 rationalism reality is ready-made and complete 

 from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is 

 still in the making, and awaits part of its 

 complexion from the future" (p. 257). On 

 the whole, then, pragmatism betokens a 

 protestant attitude towards siich catholic 

 tendencies and formulations of the orthodox 

 university philosophy of the hour. In this re- 

 spect, as Mr. James recognizes aptly on his 

 title-page, it is nothing but " a new name for 

 some old ways of thinlving." To fine, the 

 point, it is the familiar reaction of nominalism 

 against standardization of experience accord- 

 ing to archetypes " laid up in heaven." Never- 



