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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXVI. No. 667 



theless, it must not be confoianded -with its 

 medieval, or even its British (Locke, Berkeley, 

 Hume, Mill) forerunners; it does possess ori- 

 ginality, just becavise it springs from present 

 stress. The "new" astronomy, physics and 

 chemistry, the sciences of life, above all, the 

 amazing exfoliation of the human sciences, 

 particularly psychology, forbid us to rest in 

 Hegel, or even in " hegelisms " (a horrid word, 

 Mr. James !) resurrected at Oxford after forty 

 years and tricked out in the King's English. 

 Pragmatism has the courage, the temerity, the 

 "cheek," the "gall," the folly— call it what 

 you like, to stand up and say "no." Mean- 

 while, the elementary condition of its logic, 

 the vacuity (intentional, as some allege) of 

 its metaphysics, and its besetting sin, con- 

 fusion of psychological with epistemological 

 problems, prevent it from settling down into 

 any such sediment as might be labelled uni- 

 versalia post rem. Briefly, the pragmatic 

 " things," which preexist principles and genera 

 and species, are not " tea-trays in the sky," or 

 even "black cows in the night," but rather 

 palpitating human individuals gurgling along 

 their several, and peculiarly private, psycho- 

 logical "streams." Pragmatism presents no 

 commission to exalt objects at the expense of 

 " universes," but it exhibits touching faith in 

 persons as opposed to presumed spiritual uni- 

 ties that catch them up and carry them off 

 willy-nilly. Here its "humanism" centers, 

 and here its significance as a centrifugal force 

 in current thought pivots. " Rationalism 

 sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism 

 sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is 

 willing to take anything, to follow either 

 logic or the senses and to count the humblest 

 and most personal experiences. She will count 

 mystical experiences if they have any practical 

 consequences. She will take a God who lives 

 in the very dirt of private fact — if that should 

 seem a likely place to find him" (p. 80). 

 Therefore, I would urge, let us listen to the 

 new message, let us keep the ring' in order 

 that it may have free play to come to clear 

 self-consciousness (of. p. vii). Yet, let us feel 

 free to put questions, especially very ele- 

 mentary questions. Mayhap pragmatism can 



open up a world of what it calls " the real," 

 possibly it can bring us down from the dizzy 

 realm of ideas and force us to revalue what 

 it terms " the concrete phases of existence." 

 But, at least, it must afford us every chance 

 to ask what all this may be and purport. For, 

 as the " rationalist " would quote, 



I lived with visions for my company 



Instead of men and women years ago. 



And found them gentle mates, nor thought to know 



A sweeter music than they played to me. 



And visions come to all schools. 



Thus, I rub my eyes when I read this: 

 " When old truth grows, then, by new truth's 

 addition, it is for subjective reasons. We are 

 in the process and obey the reasons " (p. 63) ; 

 and I inquire : How distinguish between " old " 

 and " new " without something " purely retro- 

 spective" (p. 102) in which both share 

 equally ? What are these " subjective rea- 

 sons " if there be no universe basal to sub- 

 jective and objective alike — where do you 

 catch the characterization ? What is " the 

 process " as distinguished from " we," and 

 what, the " reasons " ? How do we get at 

 either, if they have not " been already faked " 

 (p. 249) ? Once more : " The finally victorious 

 way of looking at things will be the most 

 completely impressive way to the normal run 

 of minds" (p. 38). Very likely. But, what 

 is " the normal run " as differentiated from the 

 " minds "? If you can lay hold upon it, what 

 becomes of your " noetic pluralism " (p. 166) ? 

 It 'won't do to run off airily on the declara- 

 tion " that all things exist in minds and not 

 singly " (p. 208) ; for the why of the relation 

 between " kinds " (which are not singles) and 

 singles (which are never effective components 

 of experience save in " kinds ") is precisely 

 the great problem of speculative thought. 

 Again, Professor James writes, with admirable 

 truth, " in every genuine metaphysical debate 

 some practical issue, however conjectural and 

 remote, is involved" (p. 100). But, then, if 

 " we break the flux of the sensible reality into 

 things ... at our will "... if " we create 

 the subjects of our true as well as of our false 

 propositions " (p. 254), how are we to dis- 



